Free Will and Biblical Prophecy: Are They Mutually Exclusive?

Hi, Stile.After the discussion with Percy, I think I've understood what it is that causes the contradiction.I will interpret "free will" and "determinism" as opposites. Determinism indicates that the outcomes of all events are inevitable consequences of past events. Free will indicates that the outcomes of at least some events are independent of previous events.Thus, determinism is a world of formulaic patterns, and free will is a world of spontaneity.----- What do you call this: the "Lucky God Hypothesis?" If Person B is making a prediction of the future based on past evidence, obviously this is different from having a perfect knowledge of the future. See, predictions necessarily utilize some element of determinism: the assumption is that the past wields some influence on the future; otherwise, the prediction is just a shot in the dark. But, in the case of free will, the assumption is not necessarily valid, because it's always possible that Person A will choose something completely out of the blue. This means that predictions based on the past, in a universe where even a modicum of free will exists, can never be absolute knowledge. The outcome of an event remains uncertain until the event happens, and no amount of power and intelligence on the part of God can change this fact, because free will necessarily means that He is not in the driver's seat.So, God's prophecies in such a universe would be nothing more than predictions that have only statistical relevance to the future (even if the margin of error is infinitesimally minute). This idea could certainly coexist with free will, but no pious Christian is going to believe that God's prophecies have even a 0.00000000001% chance of not coming to pass, so it's not really relevant to the question that Straggler posed.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile.First, let me apologize for my message: I spent far too much time writing my thoughts and far too little time addressing your post. The whole thing had a flavor of irrelevancy to it. So, I'll restrict myself to what I feel is the most important thing to mention from your post: Your scenario is asking me to accept, as a premise, that my argument is flawed. So, yes, if we assume that my argument is wrong, then I agree that your conclusion is logically valid.But, I’m not arguing that free will is destroyed when the green premise and the pink premise coexist.Rather, I am arguing that the green premise cannot coexist with the pink premise.That is to say, the prophecy can only be immutable if God is in total control. Otherwise, He can either watch, like the rest of us, as the tiniest modicum of spontaneity derails the entire future, or He can stick in His fingers, unlike the rest of us, and manipulate events to keep His prophecy intact. Either way, pink and green do not mix.Edited by Mantis, : Correction of a stupid statement.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile. Same to you, man.-----There’s got to be somewhere where we’re talking past each other, because I thought I had addressed your definition directly in my last post. Let me see if I can get it right this time. What is to stop God from manipulating a person’s desires such that they can only want the future that He has already immutably decreed? Your definition of "free will" includes such a scenario.What is the difference between controlling what somebody gets and controlling what somebody wants to get?I argue that, in this context, there is very little, if any, difference, because both allow total control by a single entity. So, there is no meaningful distinction to be made between them. Thus, your definition is meaningless.However, there is a meaningful distinction to be made between a universe with one ultimate controller, and a universe with multiple, independent contributors.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, ICANT. No, I'm not actually saying that.I'm saying that, if we used Stile's definition of "free will," God could do that while still claiming that we have free will.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, ICANT. We're not discussing what God actually does do: we're only discussing the constraints and allowances of crtain definitions.Unfortunately, I don't hold a lot of optimism for your assertion, because I haven't yet been (re)convinced that a God with the ability to prophesy inerrantly leaves any room for personal choice.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, ICANT. No, I'm not actually saying that, either; although that's a possibility that my argument allows. I'm saying that prophecy and free will cannot coexist (at least until Stile corrects my error). There are several possible scenarios that are consistent with my statement:

1. We do not have free will.
2. God's prophecies are not immutable.
3. There is no God.

There might be others. If you paid attention in other discussions with me, you will remember that my personal belief is that we have free will, and God is not necessarily perfect. I have not thought clearly what my personal position on prophecy is, but, if I wish to be consistent, I will have to reject the inerrancy of God's prophecies or rethink the basic premises of my theology altogether.But, that's not the purpose of this thread, so I'll do that on my own time, and refrain from posting it here.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile. I would argue that this definition has now gone too far the other way: it now allows you to win every sweepstakes you enter and shake every defender on the football field. I think the scope of available options needs to be addressed, as well. Maybe this wording is a bit more precise: This definition could be argued to still incorporate some minor element of determinism: availability of options is beyond the individual's immediate control, but the final selection of options is the individual's choice.So, perhaps a prophecy could be manipulated to its own ends by adjusting the availability of options that the individual is allowed to select from. Thus, God could still filter the future towards His ultimate ends without totally removing our free will.But, I get the feeling that my definition isn't saying exactly what you intended to say with your definition, so feel free to explain to me what I might have missed.----- But, how can such a prophecy be immutable? A prophecy doesn't become immutable simply by virtue of being correct: a lucky guess has the same result, and, indeed even sounds like the exact same phenomenon to me..For example, what if the person's wants change between the time of the prophecy and the time of the prophesied event? Wouldn't that change the dynamic of the prophecy?If there is nothing to stop the person's wants from changing, then the prophecy must incorporate some sort of margin of error to account for the possibility of a want-change, and thereby lose its "immutable" status. But, if there is something to stop the person's wants from changing, then the person cannot be said to have free will by any definition except your old one.I don't think your argument resolves this conundrum.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Straggler. Just to clarify: you have no problem with God knowing our future, but only with Him telling us about it?It seems like the distinction is lacking a mechanism. If a future can be known, why can't it be told?

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile. What this seems to boil down to is, “IF the person doesn’t change their mind, or get hit by a truck on the way, or receive a death threat, or something, then an immutable prophecy can be made about it.”To me, “if” statements compromise the immutability of the prophecy.----- Well, of course not. Nobody can say what God can or can't do.Discussions like this are only about the implications of certain assumptions. When I say, "God couldn't do X," it is primarily based on the logic that God's attributes are not the limiting factor in the realization of X, and not that I am stipulating that a God who can do X does not exist.Here's an example:Cartoon writers like to invent heros with “super strength” who can punch holes in mountains and stuff. Now, given that the superhero has “super strength,” its perfectly possible for him to generate enough force to punch through a mountain.But, if the punch is powerful enough to break a mountain, it’s also powerful enough to break the hero’s skin and bones. And no amount of “super strength” is going to compensate for the limitations of the human skeleton: at some point, the structural integrity of the body most also be upgraded, or the “super strength” is useless. Yet, superheroes never hurt their fists while punching through mountains, and can always get up without a broken bone after a building falls on them.Just like “super strength” doesn’t automatically grant injury-immunity, so “super intelligence” doesn’t automatically grant knowledge of the future. Of course, most people don’t call God “super intelligent,” but “all-knowing,” which kind of renders my argument moot.I think we’re in agreement, though, that “all-knowing” is not----- You’re right, of course: I think your definition is superior to the simplified statement that I used in previous discussions about free will.Still, I think we both agree that free will and determinism aren’t entirely mutually exclusive. Some things (like toothbrushes) behave in a deterministic fashion; and some situations can confine the choices of things that do have free will.But, I argue that, since the option of “kicking against the pricks” is always technically allowed, free will can never truly be restricted (assuming it exists, in the first place, of course). Someone could kidnap my wife and baby, and “force” me to do whatever they wanted. I would still technically be capable of choosing not to play along, so they couldn’t really be 100% sure that I would do what they told me to. But, I think everybody “knows” that I’m not going to risk my family’s lives to prove that I have free will.----- You haven't done anything wrong with that: my argument should be scrutinized and critiqued as much as yours. Besides, my focus throughout this thread has mostly been on "you're wrong," anyway, so it would be hypocritical of me to complain. ----- It wasn't my intention to screw with your definition: I was only proposing what I thought were useful additions. It was only me trying to clarify your argument to improve the clarity of my own arguments.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile. I think we've reached a point where we understand each other, but still disagree about the conclusions. I still think that what you're describing is more akin to a "lucky guess" than an "immutable prophecy," for instance.I figured that continuing to push my side would only risk a slug-fest like that one I had with AOkid. Some people definitely deserve that sort of treatment, and some people I really just want to smack down if even they don't deserve it , but I don't see you as either of those, so I can let you disagree with me peacefully.-----I may have discovered a situation in which I agree with you, though: maybe it's possible for somebody's free will to be severely restricted by the decisions they made in the past. If someone has gone down a single path far enough, their future becomes, for all practical intents and purposes, inevitable, and thus, predictable. This could certainly be consistent with a vague, general prophecy, such as, "you will cause your own destruction," or "you will have many children," or something like that.I still think you'd have to factor in all sorts of possible minor variables, even if just as a technicality, but, if the prophecy is vague enough and based on general trends, rather than specific events, it could work. Of course, the vagueness would have to increase in proportion to the amount of time and number of free agents involved, but those would just be logistics for a large enough intelligence to work through.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile. Actually, I think a certain person's specific actions at some specific point (such as prophesying the flavor of ice cream Person A was going to choose) would be much more plagued by the randomness of free will than a general, broad prophecy like, "There will be a big war in the Middle East."Basically, I think God could make an immutable prophecy about people with free will so long as He is capable of seeing all possible alternatives of all possible decisions, and show how some things are bound to happen no matter how events play out. For instance, we are going to experience a major agricultural crisis due to overpopulation in the fairly near future (I don't know if this is actually an "immutable" fact, but let's pretend it is for the sake of this example).This way, God does not have to actually know the outcomes of every specific, future event, but can simply tell that some general condition is going to prevail, because there are so many independent actors that nobody can actually control it or stop it from happening. So, even in my "world of spontaneity," some prophecy would be possible.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile.Here's my view on the issue at hand.If free will exists in the universe, the future contains at least a tiny amount of uncertainty.That uncertainty is an innate characteristic of a volitional universe, not an issue of perspective on it.If a different perspective experiences different uncertainty, doesn't that mean that the uncertainty is just an artifact of limited perspective?Doesn't this also mean that the appearance of free will is just an artifact of perspective?Edited by Mantis, : Better phraseology

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile. Well, this is where the snag lies.The decision-making sequence of events must follow the mechanics of the universe of which it is a part. Therefore, if all 3 alternatives really are possible, then all 3 alternatives exist in the future. The two unselected alternatives are only removed from the timeline after the decision has been made.Therefore, if Odin truly sees Carl's future, he sees all three possibilities up until the point where two of them are removed from the timeline, regardless of his perspective, and regardless of whether He Himself is subject to the flow of time. The future is subject to the flow of time, and so, it will always obey the rules of time, whether or not an "outside" observer obeys them.So, if some entity who actually sees into the future does not see multiple alternatives, then, quite simply, multiple alternatives do not exist: the future, like the past, is part of a storyline being railroaded to an inescapable conclusion.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Stile. This is because there simply is no "the future": there are actually three of them. This is the point that I'm trying to make: Odin would see them all, because they all exist.And, the ability to distinguish which of them would come to fruition would require a totally different type of insight.----- How can Carl "railroad" himself? He would have to never encounter a fork in the road at all: the option of getting off the railroad would have to never come up. If Carl has the ability, even as just a technicality, to change direction, then there are, by definition, at least two futures, both of which Odin would see.

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I'm Bluejay.Darwin loves you.

Hi, Straggler. If Odin's perspective is from "within" the confines of time, then perhaps you're right (that is, if I understand what you're saying, which I won't claim is the case).However, if Odin's perspective is from "outside" of time, then surely the future would have to be represented by something; otherwise, Odin isn't really "outside" of time at all.I think Stile's argument isn't that the shape of Carl's timeline is controlled by Carl, but that one of several "pre-made" shapes is chosen by Carl at each juncture in the timeline. In this case, surely Odin would see all the possible shapes, because all are "the future" for Carl until he chooses one and discards the others.But, I think you're right that this debate suffers from poor terminology and non-intuitiveness.

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-Bluejay/Mantis/ThylacosmilusDarwin loves you.