Free will, perfection and limits on god

"These rules, however, contribute nothing to the theoretical use of the understanding in bringing the manifold of (senuous) intuitions under one consciousness a priori, but only to the a priori subjection of the manifold of desires to the unity of consciousness of a practical reason commanding in the moral law, i;e;, of a pure will.These categories of freedom - for we wish to call them this in contrast to the theoretical concepts which are categories of nature - have a manifest advantage over the latter. The latter categories are only forms of thought, which through which, through universal concepts, designate in an indefinate manner objects in general for every intuition possible to us. The categories of freedom, on the contrary, are elementary practical concepts which determine the free faculty of choice; though no intuition perfectly corresponding to the latter can be given, it yet has as its foundation a pure practical law a priori, and this...immediately become cognitions,not needing to wait upon intuitions in order to acquire meaning. This occurrs for the noteworthy reason that they themselves produce the reality of that to which they refer ( the intention of the will) - an achievement which is in no way the business of theoretical concepts. One must carefully observe, however, that these categories concern only practical reason in general, and so they proceed in order from those which are as yet morally undetermined and senously conditioned to those which, being senously unconditioned, are determined merely by the moral law."

We are conscious and have a sort of group consciousness but how should we be able to KNOW what GOD could or could not do?Kant also wrote, "The claims to freedom of will made even by common reason are founded on the consciousness and the admitted suposition that reason is independent on merely subjectively determined causes which together consitute what belongs to sensation only, and which consequently come under the general designation of sensibility. Man considering himself in this way as an intelligence, places himself thereby in a different order of things and in a relation to determining grounds of a wholly different kind when on the one hand he thinks of himself as an intelligence endowed with a will, and consequently with causality, and when on the other he percieves himself as a phenomenon in the world of sense(as he really is also), and affirms that his causality is subject to external determination according to the laws of nature. Now he soon becomes aware that both can hold good, nay, must hold good at the same time..."
but from both of this to think we can say what would be perfect for god we cant or at least I cant besides I am still perplexed why it is that Gould thought it important to point out that Creationists couldnt explain why bad things happening to animals and disfigurations in form were to be explained. I for one cant see why the strange morphologies or mutations are not SEEN as perfect or at least part of algorithms that might approach some ideal of perfection in man's willing sense.The quote it from FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS by I.KANT translated by T.K. Abbot. I dont think it insignificant that you were asking about what we we knew GOD could or couldnt do where/when the translator at the sentence before I broke of the quote said in a footnote "The puncutation of the original gives the following sense: "Submits his causality, as regards its external determination, to laws of nature."..."So sure just change you thread head from submission to affirmation and then I think the side note makes the kind. I think Kant simply meant submission as in the profession of the scientist but I might be wrong.