Summations Only

Hi, Dr Adequate. This might be a good place to start:

quote:

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Abstract.

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Free will can be understood as a novel form of action control that evolved to meet the escalating demands of human social life, including moral action and pursuit of enlightened self-interest in a cultural context. That understanding is conducive to scientific research, which is reviewed here in support of four hypotheses. First, laypersons tend to believe in free will. Second, that belief has behavioral consequences, including increases in socially and culturally desirable acts. Third, laypersons can reliably distinguish free actions from less free ones. Fourth, actions judged as free emerge from a distinctive set of inner processes, all of which share a common psychological and physiological signature. These inner processes include self-control, rational choice, planning, and initiative.

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My university doesn't have access to this journal, so I've only read the abstract; but it was the closest I could find to research on what laymen think about freewill. The bolded part of the abstract might be support for your position, but I can't really tell.Maybe somebody else here can get access to the full text.

Hi, Straggler.I've been lurking for a while here, and I don't know which side to take yet. One factor that I think needs a little more attention is the consistency in laymen definitions of "free will."I get the impression that the typical layman will espouse a specific definition of "free will," but, when asked to identify real-world behaviors that demonstrate free will, will actually uses a different definition.In this regard, I think there is actual merit to Dr Adequate's approach: it actually reconciles the layman's formal definition with the layman's practical usage.This is, however, based on a few rather unfruitful literature searches on my part. I'm hoping that either you or Perdition has access to materials that might shed more light on this topic.

Hi, Straggler. Intuition tells me that the man-on-the-street's ideas are going to be based more on practical application than on formal definition. From this, I conclude that an accurate representation of his position may actually require me to contradict the formal definition he claims to accept.If this is the case, altering or ignoring the formal definition seems warranted to me.

Hi, Tangle. I believe Dr Adequate cited advantages to the educating of said man-in-the-street as the primary purpose.

Hi, Straggler. My speculation was that the formal definition is only incoherent because the man-in-the-street incorrectly identified with it, when, in fact, his practical application of the term indicates adherence to a different definition.Under this logic, Dr Adequate's modification makes the definition better represent the man-in-the-street's actual position than the definition the layman himself preferred.But, I guess it doesn't really matter, since we're just quibbling over what to call it: I'm perfectly happy calling Dr Adequate either a revisionist or typical compatibilist.I think the main argument in support of his position is that it is a better way to communicate with laymen than any alternative. And I think we both agree with this argument.

Hi, RAZD.I think you and Perdition are making some valid points. I can agree that there certainly is a distinction between "will" and "free will" as the two of you define them, and it certainly makes sense in theory and semantics to distinguish them.My only problem with it is how well it really represents what people actually think about the subject. Surely even the most ardent believers in "free will" still believe that the decisions they make are under some measure of compulsion or obligation due to external factors, right?If they choose, of their own free will, to donate to a hospital or volunteer for disaster relief efforts, won't they acknowledge some amount of moral obligation to do so? Would their belief in free will cause them to report that moral obligation was not important in making the decision? Would it cause them to report decreasing free will in decisions with increasing moral or social obligations?Off the cuff, I don't think so; but I could be wrong. I'd be interested in finding out, one way or the other, though.My point is that it's easy to model the concept of "free will" with neutral examples like which Sudoko puzzle or which ice cream flavor to choose; but, surely you aren't proposing that free-will proponents believe all decisions are made in the absence of external obligations or influences?Perhaps the difference is that you classify such things as "causative agents," while they regard them as merely "peripheral influences" that help them make their decisions?

I always get hooked by these "free will" discussions, even though I don't have any real expertise or background in anything remotely related to this topic, and I'm too terminally indecisive to have an opinion about it anymore.Ultimately, it always just ends up being a discussion about how we define this or that particular term, whether or not we should incorporate this or that party's opinions, and how we choose to split this or that particular hair.Even though, apparently, everybody who participated in this discussion is a determinist of some form or another (that includes me now, by the way), we still have such adamantly different opinions because of our preferences for mechanistic or phenomenological approaches to the topic. Perhaps we should take this as a sign that this particular debate topic is a lot less consequential than our insistence on debating about it would indicate?It certainly was a (comparatively) civil discussion though, wasn't it?