Summations Only

Some have suggested that the internet will one day become sentient and self-aware.Does the WWW dream of electric sheep?

Is there any evidence to suggest that the brain uses quantum superposition, tunnelling etc. to function? As far as I am aware there is no evidence that the brain is anything more than a chemical computer of the classical sort operating at the axon/cellular level rather than any quantum scale.Frankly the determined effort to assert that quantum mechanics must provide some as-yet-unknown explanation for things like free-will seems to be borne from the unshakeable yet essentially baseless notion that there is something called freewill that is neither compatible with determinism nor quantum randomness.Quantum conciousness is a very contentious and not even those scientists pursuing it avidly would describe their views as the scientific consensus. What convinces you of this?

This is the article I was thinking of: LinkUnfortunately you have to pay for the rest via the New Scientist website. Unless anyone can find the full article for free?Consider it an exercise in demonstrating your own sentience as superior to that of the internet.

Well exactly. Quantum effects are always present but not always relevant. Quantum effects are absolutely fundamental to the semi-conductor devices that make up the internet but seem to have little relevance to the neurological workings of the human brain.Yet you say you are convinced that quantum effects are responsible for human sentience but dismiss the notion that something like the internet could be sentient on the same quantum basis.I still don't see what it is that convinces you of some quantum effect is responsible for human sentience. There seems to be no evidence for this at all. Oh. OK. From the cheers you got I am guessing that others thought you were attempting to make a case for dualistic freewill on the "something quantum" basis. That is the route I thought you were starting down. Indeed. Others advocating a "something quantum" as a basis for saving their notions of freewill should take note. Sure. But if it's still deterministic (albeit probabalistic) I am not sure how relevant that is here.

What determines the state of your brain? I agree. With the exception of those who consider "their will" to be some non-physical mind. Substance dualism. Which I don't think is justifiable. I wouldn't say I a happy with it. It goes against the dualistic intuitive notions that seem to come rather naturally to us. But I accept it.

I agree. But I also think you are going to have a near impossible task persuading people that they can accept determinism and still have freewill. Because what you are calling freewill isn’t what anyone means by freewill when they talk about their subjective experience and the intuitive notions it results in. As wrong headed as such intuitive notions may be — They are very hard to shake. Especially if they go to the very core of who it is we think we are.The sort of freewill people think they have is probably best described as illusory.

You are completely right if one applies the definition of freewill that you are applying. However those who say that determinism and freewill are not compatible are just as right about the definition of freewill that they are applying.

quote:

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A number of psychologists and empirically oriented philosophers have been doing experimental work relevant to these issues. One especially interesting set of results come from the work of Shaun Nichols and Joshua Knobe. In one experiment, they gave their subjects descriptions of two different universes, one in which everything is completely caused by whatever happened before it, and the other a universe in which almost everything is determined by whatever happened before except human decision making. Then, they asked their subjects to identify which universe is more like ours. Roughly 95 percent of respondents describe the second universe (the one in which human decision making was indeterministic) as the one most like ours. This result seems to strongly favor the view that our ordinary self-conception of human agency is incompatibilist (specifically, libertarian). It is difficult to imagine why we would suppose human decision making is exempt from determinism if it were not linked to our having free will.

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What the experimental data appear to show is that we really do imagine ourselves to be agents with genuine, metaphysically robust alternative possibilities, and we really do, at least in moments of cool, abstract consideration, tend to favor an alternative possibilities requirement on moral responsibility. So, the experimental data seem to be something of a victory for incompatibilist diagnoses of commonsense.

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Link"agents with genuine, metaphysically robust alternative possibilities"....The common conception of freewill is not compatible with determinism. I maintain that the common conception of freewill (or more specifically that we possess such a thing) is probably best described as illusory.

I still don't understand how you can be convinced of this. It sounds deply speculative and very poorly founded. Well the same is true of electrons. Yet no-one complains if we say that electrons behave deterministically. Albeit determinism with probability entailed. Quite.

That is the best and most concise reason for applying the definition of freewill that compatibilist philosophers apply I have heard.It's almost enough to persuade me to call myself a compatibilist.

Wiki on determinism seems to agree more with your use of "determinism" and describes what I am talking about as "adequate determinism": Link quoted extensively because I think it is very relevant here.

Yes - I was tempted to make some similar comment about your name as well.But I wasn't sure whether "Adequate Determinism" as described in that article is your position.It seems pretty close.....?If it is an accurate portrayal of your position you should copyright it or something.

Based on current conversation - Me too. Dr A has persuaded me of it's merits. Hence my near conversion. What leads you to this intriguing conclusion?I suspect it might be more to do with your use of the word "rigid" than anything. But I'd like to know more.

Yes - Which is why I cheered your Message 51I think Dr A has a very valid point as to why "freewill" should rationally be defined in compatibilist terms.But I wholeheartedly agree with you that this definition of "freewill" is most definitely NOT the common cenception of freewill that people have.The common conception of freewill is (if determinism is true) illusory. The compatibilist philsopher definition of "freewill" is, I am increasingly convinced, justified.Am I coming across as a complete fence-sitter here..........?

Again - I think I agree with you.But when I say "I think Dr A has a very valid point as to why "freewill" should rationally be defined in compatibilist terms" I mean literally what I say.His is the rational position.The common conception of freewill isn't rational. It is common. And on that basis alone I would (I think - like you) argue that this is what "freewill" actually means.Words acquire meaning from their actual usage. Not their philosophical, or rational or "should be" ideally arguments.So on the basis of what "freewill" means I'd agree with you. On the basis of what "freewill" should rationally mean I agree with Dr A.I have splinters up my arse.....

"I" being.....?What?Dualists will see "I" as something distinct (but very possibly related) to their physical brains. But what do you mean?