Summations Only

Not if your desire to be defiant is itself wholly caused by factors over which you ultimately have no control at all. No.

All determining factors, if followed far back enough down the causal chain, qualify as "external".....I don't think the distinction between internal factors and external ones holds up particularly well if scrutinised sufficiently.

I would say that we know causality is an property of our universe but we don't know if it applies any wider than that. You might say that. But so what? See both Message 137 and Message 43

I thought we were talking about free-will rather than consciousness. Are they the same thing as far as you are concerned?What would it take to demystify this in your view?

But Mod doesn't seem to be advocating "the most relevant or strongest" causes as such. He seems to be making a very explicit differentiation between internal and external causes.I don't think this differentiation holds up to scrutiny because ultimately any internal state of mind is the product of external factors. There is not really anything that is purely "the contents of my own mind" because everything we do is limited by the environment in which we find ourselves at any given time and the deterministic factors that precede it.How can there ever be any situation in which "the only constraints in play, are the contents of my own mind".......?Such a situation just doesn't exist.

Can you give an example where this is the case?I am struggling to envisage any situation where "the only constraints in play, are the contents of my own mind".

I think you and I basically agree here. The only minor difference is that where I say we should revise the term "free-will" to be philosophically coherent and able to cope with determinism you reply "Why should we?" and instead advocate that a new term be used to describe that which compatibilists are advocating (asserting?) as "free will".It's a semantic issue about what term should be used. And frankly I'm torn but come down vaguely on the Revisionist side of things on the basis that much of the things we use free will to mean in practical terms are compatible with determinism even if much of the other metaphysical baggage just isn't.

Like....The laws of physics?But doesn't that lead to determinism?

But ALL actions are ultimately the result of internal decisions aren't they? Even in your example of the gun to the head what you do depends on the very internal basis of whether you actually want to live or not. If you didn’t care then the gun would be inconsequential to your actions. If you thought your family would be better off with the insurance money from your death then you might even act to have the trigger pulled. But what you do ultimately remains indisputably an internal decision no matter how extreme you make the scenario regarding the external factors in play. External factors of this sort only matter to the extent that you internally decide that they do. How can anyone else possibly make the decision for you such that an action is not ultimately internally derived?And if ALL decisions are ultimately internal do not ALL decisions qualify as "free" by your definition of "free" being that which is "internal"....? But every single action is the consequence of a complex web of internal and external factors combined. Wanting to live or not is an internal decision. Having a gun at your head is an external factor in that decision. So the distinction you are making between internal and external just doesn’t work as a way of defining which actions are free and which are not. And I’m sure that if you told him his actions were predetermined and inevitable anyway he wouldn’t see the gun as the only thing denying him that free-will.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

And there is the problem. The man-in-the-street doesn't have a realistic concept of will. His concept of will is subjective, dualistic, inconsistent, incoherent and all the rest of it.Which is why equating the sort of highly consistent and philosophically coherent form of compatibilism Dr A is advocating with the concept of "free will" that the man in the street holds is doomed to failure.Dr A's compatibilist definition of free-will is just too frikkin well thought out to be the same as that of the-man-in-the-street in the way that he is claiming it is.

"Causes" as in external factors - Yes. But "causes" in the sense of removing the existence of ALL other "metaphysically robust alternative possibilities" - No. And that is where the man-in-the-street's libertarianism manifests itself. He believes in the existence of "metaphysically robust alternative possibilities" of a sort that determinism denies the existence of.That is The Problem of FreewillEdited by Straggler, : No reason given.

ManA (who obviously has a slightly odd worldview) believes that clouds are white fluffy sky whales swimming around in the air.ManB (who has a more scientific worldview) believes that clouds are collections of water droplets.ManA points up at the sky and says Look. A cloud. ManB replies Yes. It is a cloud. I agree.Now as I understand your position here the use of the term cloud by ManA and ManB is A) Compatible and B) They are engaging in meaningful communication because they are both using the same word to apply to the same phenomenalogical event despite each applying completely different conceptual meaning to the word cloud.Is this understanding correct?Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.

Fair enough. In this sense you seem to disagree with Dr A that his compatibilist use of the term "free will" is also the same as that of the-man-in-the-street. It seems quite clear to me that Dr A and the man in the street are applying very different conceptual meaning to the term "free will".

I agree.Which is why I think revisionism is the way forwards. Work out what the best and most reconcilable-with-reality definition of freewill is and then seek to revise the common conception of freewill accordingly.That is what I have been advocating here.

They are pointing to the same phenomenon and using the same term whilst having very different conceptual meanings as to what the thing in question is. A la the cloud example. Message 305Because we know god-concepts do exist!! Likewise we know that concepts of free-will exist. And the concept of freewill held by the-man-on-the-street is not the same as the eminently sensible one being put forward by Dr Adequate.What I don't understand is why he keeps insisting that he and the man-in-the-street mean the same thing by "free-will" when conceptually they quite evidently just don't.Edited by Straggler, : No reason given.