Summations Only

All determining factors, if followed far back enough down the causal chain, qualify as "external".....I don't think the distinction between internal factors and external ones holds up particularly well if scrutinised sufficiently.

I would say that we know causality is an property of our universe but we don't know if it applies any wider than that. You might say that. But so what? See both Message 137 and Message 43

Free will, to me, is incompatible with determinism by definition. In a long string of dominoes, the one one with free will gets to decide, itself, whether it will fall over or not (rather than the dominoe before it causing it to fall). Free will means that the choice you make was not and could not be determined before you, yourself, made it. It means that when you're standing at a Y in the road, the direction you will choose can not be traced back to the big bang, ultimately.The revisionist-compatiblist does use a different definition than this (whether or not the man in the street uses this definition, I don't know). Some people seem to be using a less strict definition of free will in the sense that raising your arm is "free will" regardless of whether it was pre-determined or not. I think that's a revision as well.And to reuse one of the analogies, I find the revisionist-compatiblist to be like this:MITS: "Were tigers created?"R-C: "Yes, of course tigers were created... ...created by Evolution!" You know what you're doing."Do we have free will?""Yes, its just pre-determined" Edited by Catholic Scientist, : No reason given.Edited by Catholic Scientist, : No reason given.

True, but you could look at the most relevant or strongest causes.There are multiple causes that conspire to create a single effect. Instead of a causal chain, a causal net might be a better description. But, we can look and see the strongest factor in the choice to wear a red shirt versus a blue shirt (assuming both are hanging in the closet near each other) is an internal cause, i.e. color preference, the feel of the shirt, or liking how it makes you look, etc. All those causes can be traced back down other causal nets and eventually you're outside of the body, but once you get even a little bit down the line, none of the causes you're looking at are sufficient to ensure the outcome, it takes a lot of them in conjunction.IN the gunman example, there are two major causes, oneis the desire to live, the other is the threat to kill. One is internal, one is external, but the desire to live, alone, is not sufficient to make a choice between a blue and red shirt, the most important cause, the one that bring the desire to live into the equation, is the threat to kill. Thus, the moral culpability resides in an external cause, i.e. the gunman.It's not exact, but neither is our sense of morality.

Yes I am aware of that paper, and find that if our consciousness as of yet can NOT be explained by quantum discoherance it only makes it that much more a mysterious.

If I'm reading you correctly, you're stating that the brain might have effects due to chaos theory. I would say this is definitely true, I'd be shocked if the brain had no chaos theory like effects considering it's such a complicated system. All I'm saying is that there is absolutely no way quantum effects can particpate, they occur at timescales far smaller than timescales of the dynamics of the brain and any chaos theoretic effects would work on those dynamics.

You don't consider yourself freer if you have the freedom to choose what you prefer as opposed to being coerced into choosing what someone else prefers at gunpoint?You must be using the 'freedom' to mean 'a binary condition meaning one is not bound by any constraints whatsoever'. Whereas I am suggesting that freedom is a spectrum. I am freer if I have no gunman. I am freer if I have a million shirts. I am freer if I am not in prison. I am freer because I have fewer constraints - not because I have no constraints. As I said, it is trivial to prove that the will is free of certain important constraints such as external coercion with a firearm... I just have to define the scenario so as to state that.I am not suggesting that one's will is free of all rules of deterministic cause and effect.I don't think you get to say 'But the incompatabilists are right, therefore the compatabilists are wrong' and end the discussion there. What we I am talking about are the points of congruency between Mr Mits and Dr A. I am well aware of their points of disagreement, and I don't think you need to keep repeating them. I agree that they disagree on the metaphysics of free will - but I also believe they agree on, as Dr A puts it, the phenomenology of free will. And that's what it means to be free will. It means that the decision came from me alone. It was an internal process of decision making that occurred within my mind unconstrained by some predominant coercive force.Mr Mits might believe that the mind is itself unconstrained by determinism, but Dr A and Mits agree that if the decision was made by my mind - free of excessive coercion, that it was an act 'of my own free will'You are using an inherently incompatabilist definition of free will, and declaring yourself definitionally correct. But why can we not use a theory-neutral defintion of 'free will' such as

quote:

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the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibility

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with perhaps some bells and whistles attached (Courtesy of Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). This does not make presuppositions about what free will is free of.As I have said previously - Mr Mits may well define tiger differently than a zoologist, but that doesn't mean they are referring to different things.Mr Mits and Dr A agree on the 'physical' free will - how it actually manifests and acts in the world as we can observe it. They merely disagree on some 'metaphysical' properties of free will. And how has Mr Mits come to this definition? I suggest he has come to that definition because that is how it seems to him the thing he has that he calls free will is. It is therefore a definition based on his beliefs about free will. But the fact that Mr Mits can make choices and subsequently calls those choices 'free choices made of my own free will' is an empirical fact. This is not an illusion.He may feel like the choice was not predetermined, but that is a belief he holds about it, that is not empirically confirmed. This is the illusion. According to the incompatabilist, yes.But something can be both free and predetermined. If you had a rope tied to my arm, and hoisted it into the air, I was not free to not raise my arm. I was constrained by something that was not my own mind. If the only constraints in play, are the contents of my own mind, then my will can be said to be free.Not free of cause and effect.
Not free of charge.
Not free of reality.But free of ropes.
Free of gunmen.
Free of external coercion.Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

Modulous writes: So this would be like some kind of Virtual Indeterminancy? No - I have a disagreement with this when unleashed upon the universe, all the way up to maybe even Stephen Hawking, as he may be being misinterpreted here, on the effect of quantum randomness. Here is why:There are some 10^80th atoms in our observed universe that are within the realm of quantum physics. Even in each of our own little space, such as a closet of shirts - which are more on the order of an Avogadro's number of atoms, there are still a huge number (some 10^23rd and more) of events to consider.There is a Law of Large Numbers that says the events of each will statistically average out to extremely close to the predicted transition from time T to time T plus a Planck time unit. For example, we can show that the odds on your next breath of air will contain a molecule breathed by Julius Caesar himself is virtually certain. But it won't be 100%. Chaos Theory is deterministic as you say, so at time T Chaos Theory kicks in and the universe starts to move towards whatever Strange Attractors there are to bear on this. Then we transition to time T plus a Planck unit. Now the situation is ever so very slightly different from the Maximum Likelihood transition's predicted result. Now Chaos Theory kicks in again on a very faintly readjusted set of Strange Attractors. We have a different starting point for Chaos. And Chaos Theory shows us that even the smallest differences in the initial conditions can make a vast difference down the road. Then we move to time T + 2 Planck units. Then T + 3, then T + 4 and so on. A Planck unit of time is extremely small (about 5.39x10^-44sec). By the time we get to the brain's ability to process a thought, gazillions of these modifications to the conditions that the Chaos worm is chewing on will have transpired.Yes, we can observe that the probabilities are heavily swayed in favor of a classical analysis prediction from time T. We have a wonderfully accurate ability to predict the transit of Venus across the Sun this coming June. A truly admirable Confidence Level. Given the number of Planck time transitions, it is ASTONISHING!!! Enough that folks like Hawking can safely argue that in matters on a sufficiently macroscopic scale, we can ignore the mysterious world of Quantum Dynamics - with the possible exception of Schroedinger's Cat. But not all parts of prediction space are so easy. The red shirt/blue shirt example does not have such a Confidence Level (assuming no gunman is in the room threatening your life to pick red at the time).Imagine a scenario where scientists predict the results of a long, protracted and complicated experiment. The ultimate result is ever so slightly off. They will say "we forgot to account for something". While perhaps very true, it may also reflect on how Deterministic they think the world of their experiment is. There is a prejudice Determinism introduces, just like there would be a prejudice Indeterminism introduces ("it was just the flying finger of fuck"). Causality itself may turn out to be yet another anthropomorphic illusion. Correlation does not imply causality. But even more, the transition of the universe at time T to time T + 1 does not require causal agents. It just happens with a shitload of relative probabilities.

bluegenes wries: Thank you.

All the gunman is doing is placing two desires in conflict that would not normally come into conflict, namely my desire to live, and my desire to wear the shirt I want. Obviously, my desire to wear the shirt I want pales in significance to wanting to stay alive, thus I do what the gunman wants.However, in the real world, desires come into conflict all the time. Sometimes they do so naturally, sometimes they do so through the actions of yourself and others. There is no functional difference except that we can point at the gunman and say "He forced this outcome." instead of having to point to the world at large and say "This all forced this outcome."Will I say I'm freer without the gunman. I probably would. WOuld I say I'm free? No. Free, on its own, is an absolute. "Free shoes" means absolutely no cost. "Free from slavery" means absolutely no involuntary servitude. Using free, but then only charging a little bit negates the use of the word free. Calling someone free from slavery because they're only enslaved on Mondays means they're not free. Are they freer? Yes. Ok, I can grant that. That means your will is freer when no gunman is present. That does not mean it is free. But the thing is, what they agree on, I also agree with. What they agree on is something just about anyone would agree with. It does nothing for the debate to assert something that everyone already agrees on. What is important in a debate is where they differ.Part of the difference, one that Mits and I agree on, is that what Dr. A is describing is not free will. Ok, suppose we do that. The compatibilists go away, and Mits and I can continue our discussion on whether people are free of deterministic causes. Now that free will has been redefined, we'll call this ability super mega ultra free will.That's why I'm against this new definition, it does nothing to solve the debate, it only makes the debate more difficult because what we understood to be free will is no longer free will, so we need to come up with a new term, and now, whenever someone says something about free will, we have to stop the discussion and ask them to tell us what they mean by free will. Do they mean the compatibilist definition or do they mean the super mega ultra free will? I think it was the other way around. People seem to have this ability to make choices such that multiple outcomes were possible. It seems like they can be primal causers. "Cool," we thnk, "let's call this ability free will."Determinism came on the scene and said, "Wait, we don't think we actually have this ability, it's an illusion."So, sure, fine, go ahead and redefine it, but that just means we have to come up with another term for how it seems people can make decisions. Then, when that term becomes the norm for describing this ability, can we please ask the compatibilists not to redefine it again? Ok, what about a chip imoplanted in the brain that makes you raise your arm?Probably not free to you either.What about a chip that makes you want to raise your arm, and you subsequently do it?Is the will free in this case?

Son Goku argues: I disagree. Regardless of how accurately the State of a Brain at time T may be completely known (meaning all the environmental, genetic, emotional stuff - everything that could ever be measured forever with whatever equipment might come to bear on this), the State at time T + 1 Planck unit later can only be described in probabilities because of Quantum Dynamics. It will remarkably correspond to the classical prediction, based on these probabilities - but it won't be exact to every atom in the universe, or even every atom in your closet full of shirts. There are so many events that even a few will not follow the Maximum Likelihood. Chaos Theory demonstrates that even the smallest thing can make a difference. While Chaos Theory is deterministic, it is only deterministic on the conditions of the universe it finds itself in at that Planck moment. The next Planck moment later the conditions are ever so slightly different, or maybe astonishingly the same as, from the Maximum Likelihood prediction. Chaos then chews on the new stuff.

This still doesn't allow free will, though, right? It only enters randomness into the equation.

I thought we were talking about free-will rather than consciousness. Are they the same thing as far as you are concerned?What would it take to demystify this in your view?

But Mod doesn't seem to be advocating "the most relevant or strongest" causes as such. He seems to be making a very explicit differentiation between internal and external causes.I don't think this differentiation holds up to scrutiny because ultimately any internal state of mind is the product of external factors. There is not really anything that is purely "the contents of my own mind" because everything we do is limited by the environment in which we find ourselves at any given time and the deterministic factors that precede it.How can there ever be any situation in which "the only constraints in play, are the contents of my own mind".......?Such a situation just doesn't exist.

Can you give an example where this is the case?I am struggling to envisage any situation where "the only constraints in play, are the contents of my own mind".