Summations Only

I disagree that free will is abstract and so does the man in the street. The man in the street will say that free will is real and exists and is exhibited as he raises his arm. It is a phenomena that compatabilists and the man in the street both agree exists and they both agree with each other about it when the phenomena occurs. How else do we know what a tiger is, but by pointing at examples of tigers and telling each other 'that's a tiger'? 'Flow' is a real phenomena, but even if we disagree with one another how it happens, we can both agree with what it is on rudimentary level. We can both point to fluids and say 'It is flowing now' even if one person thinks it is something to do with the way the atoms are arranged and their energy while the other thinks it is an inherent aspect of quickening based on the liquids relation to the Void.I'm not suggesting they agree on your 'fundamental basis' notion. I'm saying they agree on a more important basis: They are pointing to the same phenomena and calling it the same thing.The only disagreement a compatabilist has with the man in the street is what the free will is free of. They both agree with what they are functionally talking about, despite this disagreement. Just as we can call agree on tigers, despite our differences in opinions regarding their metaphysics.

Well, before I answer your main point, perhaps you could clarify this thing about conflating will and free will. Your example does not clarify where you see the difference, because it is of something which, according to you: "removes will, full stop". Whereas in order to distinguish them, what you need is an example of something that you think removes the free will without removing the will.

That doesn't mean it is not abstract. He would probably also say that justice is real and exists, and is exhibited when a jury passes a sentence on a criminal. Again, that doesn't mean it is not abstract. The reason we can do that is A) tiger is a noun and B) the definition of a tiger is a list of physical characteristics. For a child, a tiger is an orange striped cat. For a geneticist, it is probably a bit more complex, but is still a list of physical attributes.Free Will's definition is not a list of physical attributes, it contains "will" which is not physical and "free" which, again, is not physical. It is abstract, not concrete, and people will disagree on whether some things are an exercise of free will or not. The basic example of raising a hand, most will agree to, as most will agree to the courtroom example as an exercise of justice.However, some will say that a person with a mental illness acting on that illness was not exercising free will...some will say they are. Just as some will say a posse stringing up a cattle rustler is justice and some will not.

First, I am asking for what you think the distinction is. It seems to me that your definition of free will is the same as the definition of will. If you don't think there is a difference, why bother with the adjective?Secondly, I would say that determinism removes free will without removing will. People can still desire things, they can still act on thoise desires (in fact, I would say they must act on those desires) but those desires and the subsequent acting on them are determined by prior causes, ultimately back to the Big Bang, whereas free will would be acting on desires that are not caused by a chain of events leading back to the Big Bang.So, that's what I consider to be the difference, as I have been saying all thread. What is your difference, such that you need to use an adjective to modify or qualify "will"?

Nor does it mean it is abstract. Justice can both be an abstract concept and a concrete phenomena. Any concept is abstract. But free will itself: The thing being referred to by the man in the street and Dr A alike? That is a concrete phenomena that really occurs in the real world. The example was to explain the matter simply. I gave you a more complex example with 'flow'. Free will is also a noun and (says the compatabilist) has physical characteristics. But free will may well be a physical phenomena like 'walking' 'flowing' and 'breathing'.We can both agree that the man in the street is walking, even if one of us is an early Greek philosopher who has some apparently unusual understandings of the metaphysics of motion. Right, but that kind of disagreement is nothing to do with the compatabilist and the man in the street. Just as a man in the street and the coroner may come to different conclusions about a corpse apparently 'breathing', that doesn't mean they are referring to different things when they say 'breathing'.Possible disputes over some scenarios, does not mean that two people are not referring to the same phenomena when they talk about it.

Isn't that the point of this debate? I say what they're pointing to is not actually an expression of free will. They say it is. Why do we differ? Because we, either disagree on the definition of free will (as Dr. A and I do) or we disagree on the consequence of the definition (which is what I believe is the issue with me and MITS) But the MITS would say it doesn't. I also say it doesn't. So again, we're now arguing definition because while MITS and Dr. A would agree that raising your hand is an expression of free will, they are doing so for different reasons. The definition of free will must be brought in to decipher "why" they are agreeing in case one but not in case two. Exactly, the Greek philosopher has an "unusual understanding" of the metaphysics of motion. What if the Greek Philosopher's understanding was the mainstream one? That, in fact, walking was defined as motioning with your feet and legs to indicate to Zues that you wish to move in this direction and he then pulls you with some immaterial rope? Would we, then, want to just say, "Yeah, he's walking," but mean completely different things? But again, you're refering to a phenomenon where all (or nearly all) people agree with the definition of the term. If the coroner said, "This corpse is breathing." but meant that the corpse was not in fact breathing but was instead puffing up due to a buildup of decompositional gases, would this not only serve to confuse the MITS?In the question of free will, we have two groups of people, using the same definition of free will, and debating whether it exists or not. The compatibilists come along and say "you're both right, the definition of free will is wrong," why should we believe them, and what right do they have to redefine the term?

I think a lot of it comes traditionally from people's worries about moral responsibility. In a moralistic/creationist religion like Christianity, there's inevitable conflict. The god creator is omnipotent and omniscient (which includes knowing the future), so the set up is deterministic. But how can our actions be anything other than the responsibility of god? A moralistic religion definitely requires it to be otherwise.To resolve this, it was necessary to conceive of the libertarian type of free will. That meant giving humans a will that is independent of the creator, and implicitly, of all cause. So in some way our minds were our own and uncaused, and our important moral choices were in no way predetermined.That, I'm sure you'll agree, is a pretence.I think that incompatibilist physical determinists are taking the impossible (for determinists) libertarian view of our wills being free. In this sense, they're quite right; that sort of uncaused "free" will doesn't exist for determinists.Compatibilists are making a definition of will that belongs with determinism. We ourselves, and therefore our wills, are determined, so free will can only mean the exercise of will, and will is placed firmly as a link in the "chain" of cause and effect that you describe.The reason this might be a good idea is that the concepts of will and choice are very useful. Oh yes, I keep saying that people are confused, and I'm sure that a lot of the 76% that I mentioned would end up contradicting themselves. I don't really blame them. The subject is a natural headache!

Of course, and this is, as I said, the only disagreement between the man in the street and Dr A. Dr A agrees that there is something that is walking and quacking like a duck. Dr A would also agree that there is a physical explanation for the existence of ducks, though depending on where you are asking, the man on the street might say there is no physical explanation. But they are both pointing at ducks and calling them ducks. But that's exactly my point. You wouldn't mean completely different things just because of your metaphysical baggage. You'd be talking about walking whatever you thought about the mechanics of motion. But the reasons aren't important. The reason for the tiger is evolution, but you don't have to believe that to be able to identify it.The only disagreement is about what it is 'free' of. On all other counts, there is no fundamental disagreement between compatabilists and the man on the street. Yes it would confuse the MITS. That's because you are calling something that they would not regard as breathing, breathing.The compatabilist is calling something 'free will'. Its the same thing the MITS calls 'free will'. When we choose something of our 'own free will', we're both referring to same thing. Whatever its actual explanation turns out to be, whether it can be explained in terms of physical processes, or if it turns out that there is some non-deterministic animus powering the human body's decisions.The compatabilist is pragmatic. It sees the MITS say 'I have free will'. The Compatabilist says 'I agree you possess a thing that you are labeling 'free will', I'm even happy with the term since it seems absolutely appropriate: but I disagree with your understanding of its mechanics...or lack thereof.'

I guess for the same reason I'd have to use the adjective "feline" to qualify the word "cat" if I was talking to someone who claimed that there were no feline cats. In order to argue against an oxymoron, it is necessary to employ a tautology.

This is also the only difference between pure Determinists and Compatibilists. No, you wouldn't be. You'd be talking about a process that results in the same end, but the end is achieved through very different mechanics. If "Walking" is defined as Zeus pulling you, then walking doesn't exist. You can change the definition to make ti something that exists, but why would you? Wouldn't it be easier, more honest, and less confusing to simply come up with another word that correctly defines what is happening? Because it is not part of the definition of "Tiger." In "Free Will," causation is the very crux of the definition, the issue under discussion, and the entire point of the Problem of Free Will. Quite right. There is no issue with the word "will." The issue is with the word "free." (See my challenge to compatibilists and revisionists to tell me what they see as the difference between will and free will: Will vs Free WillBut this is a fundamental disagreement. This is the reason for the spat between Libertarians and Determinists. They are both using the same definition. What right do compatibilists have to come in and say we're using the wrong definition? No he's not. They're pointing to the same end result, and saying the result is caused by a certain phenomenon. They're even using the same term to describe the phenomenon, but the phenomenon they are both describing is different. Using the same term is either conflation, or deception. I assume the latter, but this just sows confusion. Yes, and the compatibilist is calling something free will that neither determinists nor libertarians would consider free will. I disagree. No, we're not. We're refering to the same end result, but the end result is not what free will is, free will is the process that led to the end result, and the process is different for libertarians and compatibilists...and our poor MITS. I agree that the compatibilist is pragmatic. He's convincing that what MITS means, what he really, deeply, means by free will is not really what free will is. But he is doing so by conflating terms. He points out the fact that if you dig deeper, that the MITS' conception results in contradictions or impossibilities, then says that free will is still possible. He then redefines free will to be something that, had he defined it originally, the MITS would have laughed at him or walked away, but now that he's broken down the walls and convinced the MITS that his worldview is wrong, he's throwing him a lifeline, using the exact same term that MITS has grown accustomed to using.It's a sneaky way to get a libertarian to agree to determinism by wrapping it up in pleasant, familiar language, but in the end, it seems deceitful at worst, and confusing at best.

So, you're arguing that "free" and "will" mean the same thing?Weird. That can't be right.In normal usage, the word free is an absolute, and in fact, means an absolute non-existence. In free will, it would indicate a will that has no constraints. In economics, free shoes means shoes that had no price.So, in your view, what is a free will free of, and in order to make the adjective necessary, it should be something that will is not free of, necessarily.

But walking does exist. We both know it does. And it doesn't matter how you think it works, we can both identify walking and be talking about the same thing. I am complete agreement that Mr Mits defines free will differently than Dr A. I'm sure Mr Mits would define 'Tiger' differently than Dr. B. But I am asserting that they are both referring to same real phenomena when they use the term and are as such in considerable agreement with one another. They have the same right you do so come in and say the compatabilists are using the wrong one All compatabalists are saying is that we should define free will by virtue of what it actually is, not what it seems like it is. Sure. Someone points a gun at my partner's head and says eat a shit sandwich. In order to do that I will have to exert my will, but will is not particularly free, since it is heavily constrained by the unbearable consequences of not eating it. Without that coercion, my will, free of such external coercive forces, would be to kiss my partner, not eat the shit sandwich. The phenomenon is the same, it's the expression of free will. Mr Mits simply believes something about the phenomenon that Dr A does not. That is of no importance: I am merely arguing for the congruency between Dr A and Mr Mits. Not for the congruencies of Dr A and the determinists. And Dr A and Mr Mits both agree that a process is going on, and that that process is called 'Free Will'. They just disagree on their beliefs about the process. I doubt Mr Mits would laugh if Dr A said "That thing you have that you call 'free will'? That's what I call 'free will'. You believe some things about free will that I don't." I used to think so too, but I was persuaded that the compatabilists have a decent point. And it is a point as equally valid as anyone else's. I personally have no set preference between the schools of thought. My own position is that we do not have free will, unless by free will you are referring to something that we do actually have. If you mean 'free will' to basically mean 'The capacity to make choices in line with what would will without coercive external forces constraining what choices are reasonably taken'...or something like that, that thing that we definitely have when as Men in the Street we are tempted to call 'Free Will'. That thing? Yeah we have that. And Free Will is what Mr Mits calls it. And Free Will is what Dr A calls it. But I don't think it is free of determinism, despite the beliefs of Mr Mits.

It seems to me that everybody is trying very hard to over-think this.Perdition raised the issue of the definition of will: This is a definition for Will¹ where the word usage is for an auxiliary verb rather than a noun.Further down is:

quote:

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Will²
noun
1. the faculty of conscious and especially of deliberate action; the power of control the mind has over its own actions: the freedom of the will.

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That seems to me to make the usage very similar to what we are discussing as "free will" ...He also says (and later repeats): Or it could be a tautology, or it could be just a slight refinement of the concept, rather than a wholesale difference - as in a discussion about wine one can talk about

1. wine
2. white wine, and
3. aged white wine

So let's look at the same dictionary to see what they say for the definition of

quote:

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Free Will
noun
1. free and independent choice; voluntary decision: You took on the responsibility of your own free will.

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So it is an independent decision that you voluntarily make on your own, while will (unmodified) can involve others and a social context.I voluntarily open my browser to my Soduko site and independently select one of four games shown in preview (with different levels of difficulty). Then I start the game in a blank square of my choosing ...I have exercised free will. I have also exercised will.Enjoy.

Only because we've agreed on the definition. If the definition we've agreed on is not, in fact, what happens, we either change the definition, as compatibilists seem to want to do, or we invent a new term.Consider "primordial soup." It was a term created to describe the then-current idea of abiogenesis. We have since learned that primordial soup is probably not the correct idea of abiogenesis. Some people, like Buz, are perfectly happy to continue using primordial soup as a stand-in for abiogenesis, but most scientists, rather than redefining the term, have come up with other terms. I think that is more honest. But the phenomenon is the definition. Or, the definition is the phenomenon. MITS says, "I am a prime causer, I choose to raise my hand of my own volition, without requiring a chain of causation back to the big bang, thus I have free will."Dr. A says, "You are not a prime causer, you choose to raise your hand due to the causes back to the big bang, thus you have free will."That doesn't seem like they're talking about two different things to you? But what is it? Should we define "unicorn" by virtue of what it really is? Since the definition we've been using for millenia is apparently not a real thing, how do we know that what compatibilists are saying is really what it is? Ok, so the presence of an outside cause constraining my will causes my will to not be free. Is that fair?If so, how is the gun any different than any other environmental factor that constrains your will? We're going to keep going in circles here. The phenomenon is not the same. The phenomenon for libertarians and Mits is one that involves a breakge of causality. That phenomenon doesn't exist, which is why I reject it's existence. You can redefine terms if you want, but all that does is make it difficult to argue the point in contention. The point of the Free Will Problem is that I don't believe there is a break in causation, libertarians and Mits do. But there are a lot of congruencies between all three parties. We all agree that fairies are not influencing our choices. We all agree that uniceorns are not influencing our choices. Where there is any debate is whether our pasts, our genetics, and our environment constrain our choices. We have decided to call the phenomenon where it doesn't: Free Will, in congruence with how it has been used since the ancient Greeks. I say this phenomenon is an illusion. Mits says it isn't. Redefining the term such that all parties agree that what is being described is true does nothing, absolutely nothing, to advance the debate, and in fact, just muddies the water, because now instead of saying Free Will doesn't exist, and having everyone understand what I'm saying, we now have to say that Free Will, as understood to mean our supposed ability to choose between two metaphysically robust alternatives, doesn't exist. But "that thing that [he] call[s] free will" is "the ability to break causation and be able to choose between two metaphysically robust alternatives." Dr. A doesn't believe he has that ability, so all Dr. A is doing is confusing poor Mr. Mits.He's saying, in essence, "That thing you think you have, I think you have it, too, except what you think you have is not actually what I think you have." I think they have a decent point, too. I think the thing they are describing is the way things work, and is important to understand. I just think calling it free will muddies the debate, takes our eyes off the actual point of contention, and could just as easily be covered by calling it "will," as the definition of will would seem to indicate, and leaving the adjective "free" as the illusion that it is.

You have forgotten the second definition, which is the one that has been under debate since the Problem of Free Will has begun:2. Philosophy . the doctrine that the conduct of human beings expresses personal choice and is not simply determined by physical or divine forces.