Summations Only

Well, the lack of connection between the premises and the conclusion is also problematic. I find the "conclusion" that I have claimed to have desires without a physical basis eminently escapable, 'cos I haven't. But it's when I start doing things that I don't desire that I don't have free will. Really, your idea of having free will sounds remarkably like the man-in-the-street's idea of demonic possession. Again, the non sequitur. Indeed, anti-sequitur, if there is such a term. It is when I start taking actions that aren't the consequences of my desires that a normal person would identify me as having lost my free will. They wouldn't say: "At last, Dr A is free!", they'd say: "Something or someone is making him do things against his will."

I think so far as it goes it does support me contra Straggler. If the layman thinks that free will consists in having those properties, then as clearly he does in fact have those properties, and as determinism does not deny them, what I am trying to say would not, in the layman's own terms, be well-phrased by telling him that he has no free will.

In the last message, I accepted your position that all of your desires have a basis in physical law, but just in case that wasn't clear, I'm happy to do it again. So, here it is: I accept that your position that all of your desires have a basis in physical law. No, because you're getting it exactly backwards. I'm not talking about you being coerced into doing anything you don't want to do; I'm talking about you making a free choice to do something you have no desire to do.But if all your actions are a consequence of nothing but a suite of desires that are themselves grounded in physical law, how can your will be free? There's no space between the premises and the conclusion, here. None at all. "Lack of connection"? The connection is that if everything you'll ever do in your life has been predetermined by the initial state of the universe, how can you be said to have "free will"? Where's the non sequitur? I don't see it. You're claiming that there's a non sequitur between "2 + 2" and "4" called "=". But that's absurd. But this is a strawman. I'm not talking about forces acting on you beyond your will. I'm talking about your will acting on your actions. If all you can do is what the laws of physics have determined that you desire to do, in what possible sense could you have any more free will than a robot?

And I don't think that's an esoteric or academic way of looking at it. That notion is suffused in our popular culture:Choice has to mean having choices, because a "choice" with only one alternative - Henry Ford's choice of "any color you want, as long as it's black" - isn't a choice at all. In a world where physical law determines your desires - the world Dr. Adequate has already granted we live in - then free will has to mean free choice, and that has to mean that there's a possibility that you can choose to do something you have no desire to do.But if your desire not to do something means you cannot choose to do it, then you have no choice and therefore no free will. You're under coercion at all times - not by any external force, but by your own not-free will.

I think we both agree that the man-in-the-street view of freewill is a bit confused. So if we did as you suggest and ask the man in the street to define freewill I suspect his initial response would be something along the lines of "To do what I want to do". At which point you could justifiably jump up and down excitedly yelling "See see. I'm right". However if I were to then point out to the-man-in-the-street that "To do what I want to do" can also include following deterministically pre-programmed actions and wants. Pre-programmed wants imposed by a deterministic causal chain of events which precede his very existence and over which he has no control - I suspect he would say "Hold on a cotton pickin minute, that isn't what I meant at all". At which point I would start jumping up and down excitedly too. Just because the first part of his description is consistent with your definition of freewill doesn't mean you can just ignore the part that isn't.Did you ever actually read any of the link I provided about research into attitudes to determinism and freewill previously in Message 107? Here is some more from that same link: LinkThe man-in-the-street notion of freewill is inherently entwined with the notion that the will is free to act as a cause rather than simply be part of a deterministic causal chain.The man-in-the-street notion of freewill is that if I decide to get up and throw the plant pot on my desk through the window then I can do so not because of a load of prior causal events but simply because I willed myself into that action. Will is the originator of cause not just a slave to it. In this sense the will is "free" (in the eyes of the man-in-the-street). Well you might do that. But if you have any intention at all of clarifying what it is you mean more thoroughly you should expect a lot of opposition on the basis that what you mean and what he (the-man-in-the-street) means by "freewill" is not the same.If it were everyone would be a compatibilist and there wouldn't be a "problem of freewill" to discuss any more than there is a "problem of tigers" to discuss.So you still need to decide whether you are going to stick to your stipulation of using intuitive man-in-the-street terminology (with all the inconsistencies and incoherence that might well entail) or if you are going to use a compatibilist definition of "freewill" that is philosophically superior but not the same as that used by the-man-in-the-street.But you (still) can't have it both ways.

It is an exercise of his will, I'll grant that, but the will is not free, it must follow only one course of action. If there is only one course of action, then it's not much of a choice, is it? Yes, I am a causal factor...but if the causes and effects can, in theory, be traced back to the big bang such that, if someone were smart enough they could foretell what I would do that far back, then it's tough to believe that I'm really making a choice rather than playing out a physics script.What I mean is that while I am a causal factor, for free will to be true, I would have to be the only causal factor. No, freedom of will means that I am the only cause, not the distribution of energy right after the big bang. I said that it was the deifnition.The problem with your examples is that you're using concrete, physical things, and then having someone use a definition that is wrong.In this case, we're talking about a nebulous concept. We can't point to something physical and say "That is a free will." All we have are definitions, and the definition that is in use in most people's minds, in philosophy textbooks, and what started the whole debate between free will and determinism is not the one you are using.Now, I agree that what you describe, where the proximal and most important causes of a person's actions being internal, is an important concept. It is the basis of the deterministic justice system and morality, but it not free will. I'd be comfortable calling it "will" or "moral culpability" or someother term we can make up on the spot if you wish, but using a term that is already in use and that means something similar but different is only going to cause confusion, as evidenced by this very thread.And you're right, the standard definition of free will is absurd when you get right down to it, but that's exactly why I became a determinist. I didn't feel the need to cling to the term and tweak it such that it made sense, I just dropped it, along with aether, phlogiston and Santa Claus.

But then how is it my choice --- if I do the opposite of what I want to do?This is what you need to clarify. According to your example, I want to eat a banana. But something makes me eat a shit sandwich, something that I don't want to do.Under these circumstances, how would we identify that something as being my will, when it is apparently something other than me and doesn't want the same things that I do? Well, like that. And, again, like that.Please remember, you are talking to a compatibilist. Merely stating a determinist premise does not make me want to jump to the conclusion that there is no free will, because I am not an incompatibilist. You need to provide a chain of reasoning. Instead, you keep on saying (in effect) "Determinism is true, therefore you have no free will" to someone whose whole argument is that the conclusion does not follow from the premise. In order to convert me, you need to convince me that the conclusion does follow from the premise. You can't just keep on saying: "Premise, therefore conclusion" when the very point I am arguing for is that the conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. I must have missed where I said that.Later in your post, you will use the word "strawman". But this is not clear.I ask you again, if something makes me do something absolutely contrary to my own wishes, by what criteria do we identify that something as being my will?According to your hypothesis, I want to eat a banana, and I don't want to eat a shit sandwich. But something causes me to eat a shit sandwich. Now, why in the world should we identify that something as being my free will? In what sense is it my will? In what sense is it mine?Edited by Dr Adequate, : No reason given.

Because it was the exercise of your will. That's how it would be your choice. That's what your "will" is, it's that part of you that you say makes choices that aren't constrained by the laws of physics. Like what? Like what? And I have. But I can't force you not to stop at the second-to-last link in the chain simply because you don't like where it leads. I can only convince you if you're willing to be convinced. We shouldn't, because there's no such thing as free will.

Maybe a more fruitful path would be for you to tell me which, if any, of the following things have free will:1) A "bristlebot" (a kind of mechanical device that is basically an offset-weighted motor on top of a brush, it trundles about at random.
2) A robot following a prerecorded series of actions.
3) A robot following a program that includes decision trees that enact different actions in response to sensor input.
4) A bacterium.
5) A paramecium.
6) A tree.
7) A squirrel.
8) A human infant.
9) An adult human being of normal intelligence.
10) A zombie trying to eat brains.Yes or no will do; I'm trying to get at the boundaries of your notion of free will.

Well, I've been thinking about your example, and it seems to me that it's too good for its own good.Suppose that scientists discovered that the basis of our decisions was an immaterial transcendent soul, and that one of the things it transcended was the determined/random dichotomy, so that it was neither of the two, but simply willful.But we could still then go up to Mr. Peanut Allergy Guy and talk as follows:Us: Scientists have discovered that the basis of our decisions is an immaterial transcendent soul, and one of the things it transcends is the determined/random dichotomy, so that it is neither of the two, but simply willful.Him: So?Us: So we've proved that you have free will! Doesn't that make you excited?Him: Not really, I always knew I had free will. Excited, no, it's like asking me to dance around because you've proved the sky is blue.Us: OK, fair enough. But we have found out something that might interest you. Despite the fact that you have free will, you were not exercising it when you refused the peanutty chocolate bar.Him: I felt like I was, why was I not?Us: Well, you see, you're rational and you don't want to die. Given these preconditions, it was inevitable that you would choose not to eat the Chocolate Bar Of Death. Therefore, you didn't really make a choice.Him: Given that I'm allergic to nuts, I'd like you two to stand a little further away from me.Now this claim that he was not acting of his own free will stands or falls no matter what our metaphysics are, and whether or not his will has a deterministic physical substratum. The objection is, once more, that his will was not free because it was not free of his will. Which is nonsense.

I don't really know.I know that I do have free will; my inference that other objects such as yourself have free will is an argument from analogy and parsimony. On that basis I think that you, the human infant, the adult human being, and the squirrel probably possess free will, and the others don't. Except the zombie, where I have no opinion. Since zombies are imaginary, I don't know what properties they might possess, it's like asking you whether unicorns joust with their horns as a form of male competition. Given that they don't exist, I don't see how you could answer that question.

But on what basis should I conclude that it was my will?This is the outstanding thing that you haven't answered.I want to eat a banana. Something makes me eat a shit sandwich, against my will. On what basis could we conclude that this "something" was my will? Like that. But there are no links. You just say: "Premise. Therefore, conclusion", when the whole thing I doubt is that the premise leads to the conclusion. That is what you need to argue for. People have said that sort of thing to me before. Usually evangelical Christians.

And this, surely, is the point where you have gone beyond mere stupidity into being just a goddamned liar. I have said again and again on this thread that I take a materialist and determinist view of the will. I have announced this point of view clearly, repeatedly, and distinctly.Edited by Dr Adequate, : No reason given.

Not really, it was merely a question. Most people, would say that Mr. Peanut Allergy Guy wasn't really given a choice in the situation I proposed. A scenario where it is constructed such that a person is forced into making a single action, despite the appearance of there being other options, constricts a person's free will (as most people see it).It gets to the question of whether you're exercising your free will if someone puts a gun to your head (or the head of someone you love). This is why we usually don't consider a person morally responsible in such cases.I was attempting, though failing, to set up a scenario where you would agree that Mr. Peanut Allergy Guy had no real choice.So, I would contend that a person might say they exercised free will in such a case, but it would be just as likely that they would say they hadn't because they weren't given an actual choice, merely the illusion of one. There are people who believe in free will who would agree that Mr. Peanut Allergy Guy did not exercise his free will in the scenario I described.

No. Your base, physical desires want you to eat a banana, but your will, which is free, overrides your base desires and you eat something else (perhaps a shit sandwich, perhaps an olive.)