Can we be 100% sure there is/isn't a God?

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To more directly answer your question... we could 100% prove the existence of a God if God decided to take a stroll down Times Square and say hi to everybody.

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Actually we couldn't prove that it was God strolling around. Trivially, maybe he has doubles like Saddam Hussein. More seriously, you would need some way of extrapolating from the Times Square epiphany to an eternal, omiscient, omnipotent being - if that is the God you wish to be 100% sure of - and I cannot see how you could do so with 100% reliability. But of course 100% certainty is a practical impossibility in virtually every imaginable field of knowledge open to objective study.Believing in God is not at all like believing in mathematical proofs or empirical theories. It is much more like being in love. It is deeply personal and, frankly, not strictly rational. When you start to discuss religious belief in coldly objective terms - these empirical evidences, those particular emotional or physical effects - one has the feeling that the essence is lost in the examination. It's like killing an animal and dissecting it to find out what being alive means. You can see how the experiment might help, but it seems to be missing the point somewhat.

Not purely emotional, but similar in nature to our emotional experiences.

The problem for many people is not that God doesn't interfere, but that it is claimed that He does - on occasions when it suits him. He does not intervene on behalf of the kidnapped, tortured and raped nine year old (what loving being could not?) but when the bar runs dry at a wedding he's in like Flynn to top up the empties.It's the inconsistency which destroys the "intervention contradicts free-will" argument.

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False analogy

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What analogy?

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Furthermore, in that example he didn't act within the area of free will.

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I'm puzzled by this. In the case of the wedding at Cana there is direct interference in the consequences of human actions, actions which were freely willed. In the case of the kidnapped, tortured and raped nine year old, there is no interference in the consequences of freely willed human actions. It's no more complex than that.In other words God does not need to bend and shape human will, but can and does constantly throughout the old testament interfere in the results of willed actions.This is what C. S. Lewis refers to when he wonders whether every time someone went to hit another on the head with a hammer, the hammer could be turned to rubber. His conclusion is that God could not do so, because then the act of hitting someone on the head would not be truly free. I say fine, so far as that goes, but then we are still left with the problem of the "traditional" God's discretionary interference. It is this inconsistency - or discretion, if you like - to which I refer.BYW, I have heard four separate versions of the origin of "in like Flynn." That it comes from Errol Flynn's famously rapid seductions; that it comes from the political machinations of Edward Flynn, a Democrat campaign manager (for Roosevelt, I think); from the alleged nepotism or discriminatory employment practices of Irish-Americans (If your name's Flynn, you're in); and finally, from simple assonance, as in "starvin' like Marvin."

Gospel of John, 2:1-12.[Added by edit]
Please clarify the "false analogy." You used the phrase when replying to my first post, and I asked for clarification. You replied to my second post but ignored the request. Pretty please.[This message has been edited by Mister Pamboli, 05-01-2003]

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Comparing a miracle that is preformed in the physical realm isn't comparable to a interference in someone's free will.

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But comparing God's willingness to perform a miracle in the physical realm to provide wine for a feast is comparable to God's unwillingness to perform a miracle in the physical realm to save a child from harm.That both include an element of will is, as you point out, trivially true. However, you suggest that the wedding miracle is not an interefence with free will.I think, nevertheless, that one can see quite clearly that the situation is sufficiently analogous. "While he did affect the consequences of kidnapping and raping the child, by saving her miraculously from the crime, he didn't change the kidnapper's ability to make their decision."In other words, God could intervene in this "situation of extreme moral injustice" (as crashfrog calls it) without interfering with free will any more than his "party trick" at Cana.

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I guess my argument would be that it is not characteristic of God to use supernatural means to serve any other purpose than to reveal himself and his will to his people.

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I understand, but there remains the problem that God does not just act miraculously to reveal his will but to fulfill his will.Think of OT interferences such as Sodom, Lot's wife, the crossing of the Red Sea, the destruction of Sennacherib - ok that was an angel, but you know your theology well enough not to quibble, I'm sure.So it is not God's will that the kidnapped child should be spared? But you're right, this is very similar to the issue you need to consider. No one with half a heart finds this issue easy, I know.

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Expanding on his fallibility. I think I'm beating a dead horse here but...If a God has to intervene or perform miracles after the fact of his creation then he would NOT be omniscient because if he was omniscient then he should have known at the beginning of creation how things would have worked out and set them in motion at the primal moment.

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The problem here is that if God is eternal and omniscient, then "after the fact" is largely meaningless when talking of her actions. Creation and miraculous interventions are not a sequence of actions by an eternal God but - from an eternal viewpoint - a single undifferentiated action.Sure, to us they appear like a sequence of actions, but for an eternal God they would be but a single expression. Expression of what? I don't know - love, godliness, existence, all of the above?(There's a big clue in here for Flamingo ...)

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Her?

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Whatever - no particular signifance to the case. If it offends you, let me know. I have never understood the problem, but I'm not out to aggravate you. Personally I prefer to switch the terms about now and then just to remind myself on the one hand, of how imperfect the personal metaphor for God is, and on the other, how far beyond our terms God must be.

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The material universes were created by God to be inhabited with intelligent, free moral agents, to whom God could reveal himself, and who would enjoy His infinite blessings and goodness through a personal relationship with Him.

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The interesting word being could. Much of what we're discussing is not whether God could, but why God does in some circumstances and does not in others. But it rather goes beyond revealing, too. God need not reveal herself at all, yet still intervene to prevent suffering. She chooses not to.

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All miracles have the same purpose, that being to manifest the glory of God(Jn.2:11), as to both draw mankind unto himself, as well as develop a deeper belief, respect and commitment to Him.

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We are not told this is the purpose of all miracles. Even if you're right it suggests that God is extremely discriminating in her interventions and does so on a self-selected basis. Such a line as you take, which I don't think is terribly convincing anyway, still leaves open the question of why all miracles would be directed to this end, why this disallows the relief of suffering for the child victim, and why relief of that suffering does not fall within those acts that "draw mankind" closer to God.

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The onus for acts of sin is Not Gods. The question is not whether it's God's responsibility to intervene in matters, but, why is mankind the only species that is so pathetically addicted to making wilful and deliberate sinful choices, such has been described by you ?

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Neither, the question under discussion is not God's responsibility for the act or the intervention but his choice not to intervene. Your second question is interesting for the origins of sin, but not directly connected with whether God can intervene to prevent suffering.

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The answer lies within the individual free will itself. Is it wicked or is it good?

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Are you sure this is not a false dichotomy? Are there also freely willed acts which are morally neutral, and what distinguishes them? Are there degrees of wickedness or goodness? If there are, is there a point at which an act is neither clearly wicked or good? How would be distinguish such acts?So far all this is so much theology of free will, but has no demonstrated bearing on why God should choose not intervene to save a suffering child, but is quite happy to contribute to the jollies at a wedding.This is the problem, and there are plenty of people on this board who go for the obvious answer - "because there is no God."

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When the awesome Orca risks its own life and rushes the beach to capture and kill a seal pup, is that survival or murder?

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Ask the seal!

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The ball is Not in Gods court, it's in ours... Whether we like it or not, all Humans are Spirit beings with a free will.

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God chooses not to intervene. God made the ball, God made the court, God made the players, God made the game. God can, but chooses by an act of free will, not to intervene in suffering - but does choose to provide a picnic for his followers, wine for a wedding, and withers a fig tree.Oh that's a good one ... did the fig tree have free will, too?

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That God allows what happens for the greater (eternal) good. This argument is inherently impossible to debate with because you can't balance an evil that is present, or in the past for that matter, in the world against a probable evil in the future. No matter how bad it is now, one can always argue that it would be worse in the future.

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Sounds like an argument the September 11th hijackers could have used in its trivial sense - an immediate evil for a greater good. Except of course that man cannot know what the implications of the implications of the implications are ...Man, on this account, does not have a totally free will, but a free will bounded by his knowledge. This makes sense, I'm sure. Man knows only his immediate circumstances and so can only act freely within them. God knows the eternal good and the long-term outcome, and so we can be sure he allows what happens for a greater use. But one of the circumstances man knows is that God allows what happens for the greater good.So back to our child kidnapper. He kidnaps, rapes and murders the child and guess what - God does not intervene to prevent. So he can rest assured that what he did was for the greater good? Even though the kidnapper cannot see what the end result is, he knows it is for the good because God did not intervene?Back to you Flamingo ...[This message has been edited by Mister Pamboli, 05-02-2003]

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You have not answered my question Mister P.
Once again....Why is the Human species the "only" one that is pathetically addicted to committing wilful and deliberate acts that go totally against light, law and conscience??

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Sorry you feel I didn't answer you. If you flick back to your post you'll see that you said ...

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The question is not whether it's God's responsibility to intervene in matters, but, why is mankind the only species that is so pathetically addicted to making wilful and deliberate sinful choices, such has been described by you ?

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My response was: Neither, the question under discussion is not God's responsibility for the act or the intervention but his choice not to intervene. Your second question is interesting for the origins of sin, but not directly connected with whether God can intervene to prevent suffering.As you can see, I addressed both your questions in terms of their relevance to the subject at hand. This seemed the appropriate response, and I still think it is. The first question, about God's responsibility to intervene in suffering, was, I think, a misinterpretation of the topic Flamingo and I were following: however, it did not really require a response, because you yourself sought to move away from that issue.If you were to press me for an answer to the substance of the second question, it would require much more background discussion which would be off topic. For example, I suspect yours is an analytical proposition and we would need to investigate this. If you want to start another topic, we can pursue it there.

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And please, since you do not believe in God, any reference to God would be both unnecessary and irrelevant then at this point.

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Read the topic title again and you'll see that I was right to suspect you of straying off-topic!

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It's a hard question to answer I know, especially from the position you place yourself in...

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Sure - open a new thread. Not sure it is a hard question at all - the Westminster shorter catechism covers it explicitly in Question 8. I had it drummed into me as a kid. For Presbyterian's therefore, the question is pretty easiliy answered. However, start the thread, and let's stuck in.

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The fact that his actions might result in a greater good does not justify them. Now if he meant for his actions to be for the greater good that is different.

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I agree totally. The intention to achieve a greater good makes a great difference.So two issues concerning human action arise from this.Firstly, is believing you act for a greater good sufficient for justification - were the September 11th hijackers justified if they truly believed they were acting for a greater good? Were the Hiroshima or Dresden bombers justified? How do we difficult cases?Secondly, is intention to act for the greater good necessary for moral action? Is it possible to act morally, without either knowing or explicitly thinking about the greater good?But for God, if we assume that he always knows what the greater good is and that he is omnipotent and eternal, we are still faced with the problem that he has failed to order things such that evil is required for the greater good. This is particularly true of those evils of which human action is not the proximate cause - accidental injuries, natural disasters etc.Again, the obvious conclusion, which many do reach, is that if God's actions are not open to human moral enquiry, then they are irrelevant to human moral enquiry.For the Christian, who may accept God's relevance through faith, we are stuck with the following problem: how do we distinguish between events or acts which are morally good in themselves and events or acts which are evil, but tolerated by God in the interests of the greater good.

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When you act totally against the moral and ethical values your god has set up, how can you expect your actions to be justified?

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But then what are the "moral and ethical values"? To act within the scope of our knowledge? Or are there acts which are intrinsically morally and ethically wrong?But then is God is able to permit some of these acts (child rape?) on the basis of knowledge of a greater good? Maybe it is knowing the greater good rather than believing the greater good? But does that imply that our ethics can only be based on certain knowledge, not on belief or faith?If not, and belief or faith in a greater good is sufficient, then we're back to the beginning, believing that something done for the greater good overrides the moral and ethical value of the act in itself ...

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I think that because the concept of the greater good is beyond the scope of our understanding, we have to act within the moral perameters that God has set up for us

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And how do we know what these moral parameters are? Is it enough to believe we are working with God's moral parameters?

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Now, you also have to understand that sometimes God can work through moral and natural evils.

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Not really ... if God works through what we would call an evil, then either she is capable of evil - not wholly good - or it's not really an evil. But then good and evil would be relative to knowledge of a greater good?I don't think it flies. Remember the original point that got us here was how one could believe in a God who could permit evil without intervention - now we seem to be a place where God (who is traditionally wholly good) uses evil in a way that is beyond our comprehension, implying that evil is not really evil, or God is not wholly good. Sounds like an even worse mess!