Register | Sign In


Understanding through Discussion


EvC Forum active members: 61 (9209 total)
3 online now:
Newest Member: The Rutificador chile
Post Volume: Total: 919,503 Year: 6,760/9,624 Month: 100/238 Week: 17/83 Day: 0/8 Hour: 0/0


Thread  Details

Email This Thread
Newer Topic | Older Topic
  
Author Topic:   Do I have a choice? (determinism vs libertarianism vs compatibilism)
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2575 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 181 of 210 (363869)
11-15-2006 8:02 AM
Reply to: Message 176 by Tusko
11-14-2006 9:59 AM


Violent men
I consider people rational beings. I don't mean rational in an objective sense (I've done my fair share of really stupid things in my time), but rather rational in a subjective sense. That is to say, that every decision we make might not improve our lot, or the lot of others, but nonetheless it is enacted because some part of us believes, consciously or unconsciously that it is the most appropriate course of action at the time.
Some people -- very violent men for instance -- will believe that attacking others is the most appropriate course of action even when, in an objective sense, it is probably more dangerous in the short term and more likely to lead society's application of restrictive measures like prison in the long term.
However, they will persist in this behaviour until they die, unless that belief is changed. I can see how change might be precipitated from without - by a kind of societal reprogramming, to put it crudely. But for a person to change independently, I can only see this as possible if there is already a seed of the desire to live a more peacable life planted in them.
I would say that out actions are determined not so much by our beliefs as by our desires. When we do things it's either to pursue pleasure or to avoid pain. Without these motivations we don't tend to do anything very much.
Now imagine we have two violent men, one who is violent but suffers misery because of the social condemnation his violence brings down on him, and another who takes an unalloyed pleasure in his violence.
The first man will be motivated to seek ways of combating his violent tendencies because his actions cause him misery as well as pleasure. He may find religion, or he might start reading psychology and learn how to change his behaviour, possibly even taking a course of therapy to achieve this.
The second man, on the other hand, is unlikely ever to want to change his behaviour. He'll never seek out any kind of therapy, because he doesn't have the motivation to change.
So, I'd argue that we do have freedom to change our behaviour, that changing behaviour is no different to learning a language or learning how to drive a car. It's just a matter of re-programming ourselves.
To be honest, I don't think our model of how humans work is actually that different, Tusko. I think we're just approaching this subject from different angles. If I understand you correctly, you're saying that all our knowledge ultimately comes from outside, that we can't know anything that we haven't experienced. And I wouldn't disagree with that. But to you that means that we can't be free in any meaningful sense, because to be free one needs to act independently of those external influences. Is that a reasonable interpretation of your position?
To me, though, being free means doing what I want. The notion of being entirely free from my desires is meaningless to me. Now if my actions were entirely driven by my desires, that would be a different matter, I would accept that in such a case I couldn't be considered free. But what actually seems to happen, when I come to choose an action, is that I have the ability to suspend choosing while I judge the merits of following one course of action or another (the decision making that we talked about in a previous post). So, if I'm a smoker giving up cigarettes I have a choice between lighting up and not lighting up, between fulfilling my desire for nicotine and my desire to be free of the addiction. I'm driven by both desires, but it's not the desires themselves that determine my action, it's my choice between those desires.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 176 by Tusko, posted 11-14-2006 9:59 AM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 185 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-15-2006 9:36 AM JavaMan has replied
 Message 191 by Tusko, posted 11-16-2006 6:13 PM JavaMan has replied

  
DominionSeraph
Member (Idle past 5011 days)
Posts: 365
From: on High
Joined: 01-26-2005


Message 182 of 210 (363870)
11-15-2006 8:08 AM
Reply to: Message 179 by JavaMan
11-15-2006 7:24 AM


JavaMan writes:
You're a bit rude, aren't you?
More than a bit.
JavaMan writes:
Do you want to engage in debate, or do you just want to make snide remarks?
I want you to do better.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 179 by JavaMan, posted 11-15-2006 7:24 AM JavaMan has not replied

  
DominionSeraph
Member (Idle past 5011 days)
Posts: 365
From: on High
Joined: 01-26-2005


Message 183 of 210 (363873)
11-15-2006 8:47 AM
Reply to: Message 180 by JavaMan
11-15-2006 7:31 AM


Re: Matbe you could explain
JavaMan writes:
Maybe you could explain why your analogy with hardware and software is relevant to my argument?
Software - Wikipedia
"Software fundamentally is the unique image or representation of physical or material alignment that constitutes configuration to or functional identity of a machine,"
Software is a representation of a segment of reality. You can leave the representation out without affecting anything, as it's not real. Software doesn't affect anything -- the physical state of the hardware does as it acts on itself.
So, software is a special case, as it wouldn't be integrated into a deterministic model. That doesn't mean that a deterministic model of a computer that only includes what's really there is flawed.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 180 by JavaMan, posted 11-15-2006 7:31 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 184 by nwr, posted 11-15-2006 9:20 AM DominionSeraph has replied
 Message 189 by JavaMan, posted 11-15-2006 3:56 PM DominionSeraph has not replied

  
nwr
Member
Posts: 6484
From: Geneva, Illinois
Joined: 08-08-2005
Member Rating: 8.7


Message 184 of 210 (363880)
11-15-2006 9:20 AM
Reply to: Message 183 by DominionSeraph
11-15-2006 8:47 AM


Re: Matbe you could explain
I don't see how that answers JavaMan. Your comment in Message 172 is still a mystery to me. What were you trying to say?

Just say no to McCain 2008; he abandoned principle when he caved on habeus corpus

This message is a reply to:
 Message 183 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-15-2006 8:47 AM DominionSeraph has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 186 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-15-2006 9:42 AM nwr has replied

  
DominionSeraph
Member (Idle past 5011 days)
Posts: 365
From: on High
Joined: 01-26-2005


Message 185 of 210 (363884)
11-15-2006 9:36 AM
Reply to: Message 181 by JavaMan
11-15-2006 8:02 AM


Re: Violent men
JavaMan writes:
So, I'd argue that we do have freedom to change our behaviour, that changing behaviour is no different to learning a language or learning how to drive a car. It's just a matter of re-programming ourselves.
Don't confuse motion for freedom.
JavaMan writes:
I have the ability to suspend choosing while I judge the merits of following one course of action or another
Did you choose to do that? If so, do you have the ability to suspend choosing whether or not you will suspend choosing while you judge the merits of following one course of action (suspending choosing) or another (not to suspend)?
If so, can you suspend choosing that?
And that?
And that?
"I'm going to judge whether or not best course of action is to judge whether or not the best course of action is to judge whether or not the best course of action is to judge whether or not the best course of action is to judge whether the best course of action is to do A or B."
Edited by DominionSeraph, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 181 by JavaMan, posted 11-15-2006 8:02 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 188 by JavaMan, posted 11-15-2006 11:34 AM DominionSeraph has replied
 Message 190 by PurpleYouko, posted 11-16-2006 11:58 AM DominionSeraph has not replied

  
DominionSeraph
Member (Idle past 5011 days)
Posts: 365
From: on High
Joined: 01-26-2005


Message 186 of 210 (363885)
11-15-2006 9:42 AM
Reply to: Message 184 by nwr
11-15-2006 9:20 AM


The difference lies in their reality. Hardware is real, software not. Understanding this should lead to an understanding of why software would be left out of a model of reality.
Edited by DominionSeraph, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 184 by nwr, posted 11-15-2006 9:20 AM nwr has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 187 by nwr, posted 11-15-2006 9:48 AM DominionSeraph has replied

  
nwr
Member
Posts: 6484
From: Geneva, Illinois
Joined: 08-08-2005
Member Rating: 8.7


Message 187 of 210 (363886)
11-15-2006 9:48 AM
Reply to: Message 186 by DominionSeraph
11-15-2006 9:42 AM


But how does that connect back to JavaMan's comment. You seemed to think you were refuting that comment.
You are probably making some unstated assumption about cognition and software. But it isn't easy to follow unstated assumptions.

Just say no to McCain 2008; he abandoned principle when he caved on habeus corpus

This message is a reply to:
 Message 186 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-15-2006 9:42 AM DominionSeraph has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 196 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-20-2006 6:02 PM nwr has seen this message but not replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2575 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 188 of 210 (363915)
11-15-2006 11:34 AM
Reply to: Message 185 by DominionSeraph
11-15-2006 9:36 AM


Re: Violent men
Don't confuse motion for freedom.
What do you mean?
Did you choose to do that? If so, do you have the ability to suspend choosing whether or not you will suspend choosing while you judge the merits of following one course of action (suspending choosing) or another (not to suspend)?
If so, can you suspend choosing that?
And that?
And that?
Why do I need to be free to choose whether to suspend choosing or not? Again you're making the mistake of thinking that what people mean by freedom is freedom from any cause. It's enough that I can suspend my action and choose to fulfil one desire or the other. I don't need to prove some imaginary notion of freedom in some infinite regression of cause and effect.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 185 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-15-2006 9:36 AM DominionSeraph has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 198 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-20-2006 6:31 PM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2575 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 189 of 210 (363932)
11-15-2006 3:56 PM
Reply to: Message 183 by DominionSeraph
11-15-2006 8:47 AM


Re: Maybe you could explain
Software is a representation of a segment of reality. You can leave the representation out without affecting anything, as it's not real. Software doesn't affect anything -- the physical state of the hardware does as it acts on itself.
So, software is a special case, as it wouldn't be integrated into a deterministic model. That doesn't mean that a deterministic model of a computer that only includes what's really there is flawed.
It depends what you want to model, DS. If you want to model the architecture of a computer, then, yes, it's quite reasonable to leave out the software. But if you want to model what the computer does, your model wouldn't be very useful if you left out the software (as software is just the instructions that tell a computer what to do).
That being said, I don't accept that your hardware/software analogy is particularly useful for understanding cognition. Our subjective experience isn't a set of instructions for running the brain or body. (Organisms can quite happily function without subjective experience, even without a brain at all). Rather, our subjective experience seems to emerge out of the physical hardware of the brain, in a sense to be caused by the neural activity that we can observe externally. But as well as being caused by that activity it also seems to exert effects. If I decide to move my finger, my finger moves; if I decide to slow down my breathing, my breathing slows. And my subjective experience of willing those acts plays an important role in initiating the brain activity that leads to the physical actions.
Using analogy is a useful way to reason about things, especially things like consciousness that are pretty much unique. Every explanation we provide employs analogy of some kind - it's the only way we can approach something novel, by comparing it with something we understand. But you should be wary of getting carried away - an analogy is always a simplification - the real thing is always far more complicated.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 183 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-15-2006 8:47 AM DominionSeraph has not replied

  
PurpleYouko
Member (Idle past 137 days)
Posts: 714
From: Columbia Missouri
Joined: 11-11-2004


Message 190 of 210 (364084)
11-16-2006 11:58 AM
Reply to: Message 185 by DominionSeraph
11-15-2006 9:36 AM


FreeWill
Did you choose to do that? If so, do you have the ability to suspend choosing whether or not you will suspend choosing while you judge the merits of following one course of action (suspending choosing) or another (not to suspend)?
If so, can you suspend choosing that?
And that?
And that?
This is summed up rather eloquently by Rush in their song "Freewill"
Rush writes:
You can choose a ready guide
in some celestial voice.
If you choose not to decide
you still have made a choice.
You can choose from phantom fears
or kindness that can kill.
I will choose a path that's clear.
I will choose freewill,

This message is a reply to:
 Message 185 by DominionSeraph, posted 11-15-2006 9:36 AM DominionSeraph has not replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 357 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 191 of 210 (364172)
11-16-2006 6:13 PM
Reply to: Message 181 by JavaMan
11-15-2006 8:02 AM


Re: Violent men
I think you are right - "We're not so different, you and I". I'm just coming back to the differences again because they are the most fun bits to rail over...
By the way, I'm experiencing quite a strong desire to stamp back over familiar ground in this post... which is quite hard to resist. Excuse me if this is too familiar to a previous post.
For example, when you say:
I'm driven by both desires, but it's not the desires themselves that determine my action, it's my choice between those desires.
I want to cry out: but recognising a choice is to be made, and weighing up the pros and cons in order to make that choice are totally reliant on what we have learned and what we believe.
To use your example: if we lived in a culture that didn't have systematic scientific evidence of the serious health implications of smoking (say Edinbrugh in the 1780s), then we might only be prompted to stop smoking because of the smell, or if our spouse didn't like it. If we liked the smell, and so did they, then stopping might not arise in our minds as an issue.
I also think the distinction between beliefs and desires is useful(though maybe "learned behaviours" would be a better way of saying "beliefs").
I think that if it was as clear cut that we were attracted to pleasure and repelled from pain, then we would all be uncomplicatedly hedonistic. And there's another apparent problem: pain can be pleasure and vica versa - and not just for masochists. I think these apparent problems - why aren't people always hedonistic? why do people sometimes choose to harm themselves? aren't problems any more if we consider peoples' actions as the result of learned behaviours... although desire - hardwired behaviour - has to play a part too.
I'm interested in your contrasting of the two violent men in your last post. Why is the miserable man bothered by society's condemnation and the happy one isn't? I think the reasons to be found in his circumstances. I think you know what I mean here - I feel like I'm repeating myself a bit too much, sorry.
I think your assessment of my position is pretty fair. As you say,to me the whole idea of freedom seems meaningless unless we could actually choose between various choices when free to do so. If that freedom doesn't exist - and I don't believe it can - then all we can experience is the same kind of freedom that a boulder enjoys to roll down hill unimpeded by obstacles. It just doesn't seem free to me - and I don't see why this apparently impossible thing called freedom could be attractive. I agree that nothing can be free, in my terms.
I think it might be helpful if people questioned the idea of freedom and the limits of it a little bit more.
While I accept that you have every right to call your ability to make choices unimpeded by the interference of say, axe-wielding psychopaths or the CIA, it still seems artificial to draw a distinction between external constraints that limit our choices (like people with guns and gravity) and internal ones - like our most uncomplicated desires and our learned behaviours. They all combine to reduce our choices. Now clearly, I'd rather that I didn't do something because I had the belief that it would be dangerous or counterproductive rather than someone was physically restraining me from doing it. But I don't think what I find more palatable has much bearing on the central issue - which is that either way I can't really choose. I can't choose not to be constrained by my beliefs and learned behaviours. In a similar way, I can't choose not to be constrained by a straightjacket if someone puts one on me.
Does that make sense?

This message is a reply to:
 Message 181 by JavaMan, posted 11-15-2006 8:02 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 192 by JavaMan, posted 11-17-2006 1:14 AM Tusko has replied
 Message 193 by JavaMan, posted 11-17-2006 11:20 AM Tusko has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2575 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 192 of 210 (364269)
11-17-2006 1:14 AM
Reply to: Message 191 by Tusko
11-16-2006 6:13 PM


Re: Violent men
While I accept that you have every right to call your ability to make choices unimpeded by the interference of say, axe-wielding psychopaths or the CIA, it still seems artificial to draw a distinction between external constraints that limit our choices (like people with guns and gravity) and internal ones - like our most uncomplicated desires and our learned behaviours. They all combine to reduce our choices. Now clearly, I'd rather that I didn't do something because I had the belief that it would be dangerous or counterproductive rather than someone was physically restraining me from doing it. But I don't think what I find more palatable has much bearing on the central issue - which is that either way I can't really choose. I can't choose not to be constrained by my beliefs and learned behaviours. In a similar way, I can't choose not to be constrained by a straightjacket if someone puts one on me.
Does that make sense?
Yes it does. And what I'm arguing, and what most compatibilists argue (I'm going over old ground now ) is that we have freedom in the sense we normally mean that word, i.e. we have freedom to choose between alternative courses of action. The fact that these choices are constrained by our desires and learned behaviour doesn't reduce our freedom, because without the constraints, the choices wouldn't be our choices.
But, to put my position into perspective, I don't believe in the kind of unattached freedom that philosophical libertarians argue for. My view of human behaviour is close to yours - the freedom we exercise is constrained by learned habits. Where I differ, I think, is that I believe we're hard-wired to seek out ways of changing our behaviour to cope with the environment better. That's what most of our extra cerebral processing seems to be designed for.
I'll get back to some of your other points in another post. I particularly look forward to discussing hedonism and masochism . (That smiley looks as though it's leering - maybe I should get rid of it...)

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 191 by Tusko, posted 11-16-2006 6:13 PM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 194 by Tusko, posted 11-18-2006 11:24 AM JavaMan has replied

  
JavaMan
Member (Idle past 2575 days)
Posts: 475
From: York, England
Joined: 08-05-2005


Message 193 of 210 (364332)
11-17-2006 11:20 AM
Reply to: Message 191 by Tusko
11-16-2006 6:13 PM


Pain and pleasure
I think that if it was as clear cut that we were attracted to pleasure and repelled from pain, then we would all be uncomplicatedly hedonistic. And there's another apparent problem: pain can be pleasure and vica versa - and not just for masochists. I think these apparent problems - why aren't people always hedonistic? why do people sometimes choose to harm themselves? aren't problems any more if we consider peoples' actions as the result of learned behaviours... although desire - hardwired behaviour - has to play a part too.
This is an age old debate. You can find some of the best arguments in Cicero, who, though he was a Stoic himself, gave a good account of the Epicurean position (which is what I was describing in the previous post). Here's a good link to the relevant bit of Cicero's De Finibus Bonorum et Malorum:
On the Ends of Virtue
Here's my own take on the issues you raised:
Hedonism
The physical pleasures we associate with the word hedonism (drinking and sex mainly) are certainly pleasurable, and we do seek them out, but if they're overindulged they cause us pain and misery as well (as anyone who's had an affair or got slaughtered on a Saturday night will agree). We're as much driven by the avoidance of pain as by the pursuit of pleasure, so we tend to seek out a middle ground with these hedonistic pleasures.
Masochism
A masochist gaisn sexual pleasure from the physical pain. Do I need to say more?
Self-harm
This is different from masochism. There doesn't seem to be any sexual pleasure gained when people self-harm. So why do they do it? Our immediate question is: What do they get out of it? (Which effectively means: What pleasure do they get out of harming themselves?). And generally the answer is that it gives them a sense of control. They get an emotional pleasure out of having the power to cause pain to themselves, or possibly, they enjoy having the power to cut their skin and being able to withstand the pain. Whatever the exact motivation, the point is that they are getting an emotional pleasure from what seems to us a completely negative action.

'I can't even fit all my wife's clothes into a suitcase for travelling. So you want me to believe we're going to put all of the planets and stars and everything into a sandwich bag?' - q3psycho on the Big Bang

This message is a reply to:
 Message 191 by Tusko, posted 11-16-2006 6:13 PM Tusko has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 195 by Tusko, posted 11-18-2006 11:45 AM JavaMan has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 357 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 194 of 210 (364545)
11-18-2006 11:24 AM
Reply to: Message 192 by JavaMan
11-17-2006 1:14 AM


Christ - it's a rambler
(Good god, this is a rambler. Apologies. I have tried to boil it down as much as I can, but more bits keep appearing. I have cut loads of other bits though that I realised didn't make any sense...)
As I've said before, from my perspective the idea of freedom, to me at least, literally doesn't make any sense. Still I only see a dichotomy: either the decisions we make are in response to our hard- and soft-wired behaviours, or they are arbitrary determined. Neither seems to be free to me - but that doesn't bother me, like it doesn't bother me when someone tells me I can't do breaststroke faster than the speed of light. I'm not going to lose any sleep over it.
A compatiblist would say, I think, that this is all fine, but the fact remains that its a free choice as long as it is made without external constraints. Internal constraints aren't problematic for compatiblists because, as you say, if we didn't have the beliefs and learned behaviours that allow us to form our response, then it wouldn't be a personal choice anyway.
So we have different definitions of freedom. My (impossible) freedom is something that isn't arbitrary or predetermined. A compatiblist's freedom is simply a choice made without an external compulsion.
Central then, to the compatiblist, is that there is some significant difference between external and internal compulsions. I contend that any such distinction is very difficult, if not impossible to draw.
For one thing, it is important to note that the barrier between internal and external constraints is a permeable one. All internal constraints, as far as learned behaviours go anyway, are the result of external happenings, rendered into experiences. This is one reason why it might be artificial to draw a distinction between internal and external constraints.
From what you've written so far, I can only really see two way that a compatiblist might make the distinction. It could be :
1) Essentially emotive: that is, something isn't free when an agent feels unhappy that they have been coerced by external forces, not because what they are doing is necessarily dangerous but because they don't feel in control of their destiny. Likewise, something is free when you feel as though you have made a decision and you are in control of your destiny.
2) If we believe that a person holds some kind of ownership over their individual beliefs and learned behaviours, then they can call their exercising of these "free".
But I'm not convinced by either.
Someone supporting the first instance argues that If you do something without being compelled by external forces, then you are content at some fundamental level, even if the act is self-destructive, because you are in control of your own destiny. On the other hand, if you do something because external forces compel you, you cannot be content on that same fundamental level - even if the act is pleasurable - because you aren't in control of your destiny.
But I don't think the fundamental level is very fundamental at all - I think it is merely something that we have learned - i.e. that we should all seek to be in control of our destiny - that makes us feel uncomfortable when factors beyond our control take over. My whole argument is that there probably never is a circumstance when we are anything other than a passenger.
So if there is difficulty with that "fundamental bottom line" of wanting to be in control of our own destiny, then we are just left with the emotive angle - that is: do external factors generally make us unhappy when they influence us and do internal factors generally make us happy when they are expressed?
As we know, there are a whole load of learned behaviours that can make us very unhappy - just look to the alcoholics, paedophiles, or people with OCD. Acting on these preferences, though probably unavoidable if they are sufficiently strong, will most likely result in less contentment, despite the fact that they come from within.
There are also a whole load of external forces that we don't mind - gravity, speed of light, etc... that limit what we can do. You might argue that these things don't limit us in the same way that a criminal who ties us up, but I think they act in just the same way. They both prevent us from doing things that we might want to do. There are many circumstances where we desperately might want to fly, for instance, like you might if a child fell out of a high window.
Remember, if we are looking at the world this way then we cannot hold people to moral account any more than we can gravity, because their beliefs will be limiting their actions as well as ours.
Also, as a side-note, people would only get comfort from believing they were in control of their own destiny in a society that believed that we can control our own destiny.
The other alternative that I can see is that if we assume ownership of our own learned behaviours, then we can call ourselves free.
Maybe even to a compatliblist, there is something significant about the uniqueness of the individual's beliefs and preferences that lead to any choice; at least, that's what I understand when you say...
The fact that these choices are constrained by our desires and learned behaviour doesn't reduce our freedom, because without the constraints, the choices wouldn't be our choices.
But as far as I'm concerned, just because my preferences and inclinations are unique to me, I'm not any more the owner or author of mine than I am of yours. To me this seems just the same as my relationship to external constraining factors, that is, I don't get ownership over external constraints simply because they are unique to me. (If someone was to compel me in a novel way, never used before or again, I couldn't say I was free because the means of compulsion was unique to me.)
To me, this seems directly analogous to someone who says that they want to have children so they can pass on "their" genes. Actually, you don't own your genes. You didn't choose your genes. You inherited them. So you are not an owner, merely a vessel.
Similarly, I don't see myself as an owner or author of my beliefs, or if I am, it is only in such a limited sense as to be effectively meaningless. I see myself as a vessel for my beliefs: beliefs that I have collected like a saucepan left outside will rain.
So if I don't own them, how can my exercising of them be anything other than another kind of compulsion?
So in conclusion, I still don't really understand why it's called freedom when I chose something but compulsion when someone makes me do something; the former seems just as compelled as the latter. Its just that we are attuned to recognise the actions of those who try to prevent us from doing things

This message is a reply to:
 Message 192 by JavaMan, posted 11-17-2006 1:14 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 201 by JavaMan, posted 11-21-2006 8:05 AM Tusko has replied

  
Tusko
Member (Idle past 357 days)
Posts: 615
From: London, UK
Joined: 10-01-2004


Message 195 of 210 (364550)
11-18-2006 11:45 AM
Reply to: Message 193 by JavaMan
11-17-2006 11:20 AM


Re: Pain and pleasure
I agree with what you say about hedonism, and I think it is best understood in terms of learned behaviour. If we were simply attracted to pleasure then we would drink and fuck until everything inside us shrivelled up and went blue, and then it would be too late. Instead we listen to the pain as well, and factor that into our understanding of our raucous behaviour and its effect on us.
You need say no more about Masochism!
I'm aware that self-harm is different from Masochism. I didn't mean to bracket them together as necessarily pleasurable for the same reason, I merely wanted to draw attention to the fact that pleasure (whether sexual or "emotional") and pain aren't very easily distinguishable in some circumstances.
The reason I brought this up was because I thought, erroniously, you were offering an explanation of human behaviour on a hedonistic model rather than the model I favour of learned and biologically hard-wired behaviours.
ABE: oh, and for some reason I can't go to the links that you gave for Cicero. I've never read any of him and wonder what he's all about. Also - was Locke enlightening? I haven't got round to getting a copy of On Human Understanding... if that's what its called. I think my dad has one lying around his house.
Edited by Tusko, : No reason given.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 193 by JavaMan, posted 11-17-2006 11:20 AM JavaMan has replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 202 by JavaMan, posted 11-21-2006 8:28 AM Tusko has replied

  
Newer Topic | Older Topic
Jump to:


Copyright 2001-2023 by EvC Forum, All Rights Reserved

™ Version 4.2
Innovative software from Qwixotic © 2024