Does Evolution Have An Objective?

Probabilistically deterministic Yes. I'll run with Stanford's theory-neutral definition: the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their conduct in the fullest manner necessary for moral responsibilityBut I hold that this is really only a working definition and a final definition would require a lot of philosophical heavy lifting. That hinges on the word 'capacity'. From a subjective point of view eating beef and broccoli was a possible world^*, and there is insufficient information available to the subject to rule it out until a certain point (called a final decision). Further information can be found At this encyclopedia of philosophy entry

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^* We exist in a certain world where our actions are determined by our history. Subjectively, we do not know which of a set of possible worlds we inhabit. Occasionally we will make a decision that is made in awareness of their consequences. There are possible worlds in which we make alternative decisions. This is a 'free choice' made with 'free will' though it is determined ultimately by the actual world in which we live.

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A further note, I'm not really a compatabilist, it is just the view being put forward. I personally would prefer to suggest that we have no free will, but that we have moral responsibility - the end result is largely identical to compatabilism however.

It is likely probabilistic. However, I consider it likely that probabilistic effects have little or no influence on whole person behaviour. I have also mostly been discussing a deterministic universe in this thread. Yes. We have free will if we choose our own actions. I emphasise 'we' because to have free will I think you also require higher cognitive functions and the like so that you can reasonably be described as knowing what you are doing. Capacity is a problematic term. As Mod points out it means different things. We would always make the same choice if that is what you mean.

I'll bite... I don't know - probabilistic I suppose. It seems like it and I believe we do. You're free to change the universe at will by making conscious reality-affecting decisions that alter the future outcome of it.This is incompatible with the complete determinism mentioned below. Yes. I suppose we should roll the OP into this... "Does evolution have an objective?"I say no. My opponents are in a position where they'd have to say that it does (in the sense than an Excel spreadsheet "makes choices")With a big part of evolution being random mutation, we'd expect that, like radioactive decay or brownian motion, that a rerun of the universe wouldn't leave all the same pieces in all the same places.A particular mutation might not happen the second time around.The strict determinists are in a position where a rerun of the universe would end up exactly with me sitting here typing this message, with all the exact same mutation I have, every time we reran the universe.*With that, and if you want to say that an Excel spreadsheet "makes choices", I don't see how they could have any problem with saying that evolution has an objective. (other than avoiding all the ID crap that the OP rolls in with is).

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*If not, then its like way back in Message 21, where I wrote: "I guess we understand different things by the phrase "completely deterministic"..."

Has someone just said 'nuh-uh they are too compatible'? Maybe so, but does that get us to moral responsibility?

I don't understand how you are unable to see the contradiction between (1) a universe where you'd make the same choices everytime because of the conditions leading up to it and (2) one where you have conscious control over the outcome by willfully deciding on your own, partially independent of the conditions leading up to it.Where (1) is summarized as:

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We would always make the same choice if that is what you mean.

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and (2) as:

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We have free will if we choose our own actions.

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Yes, Mr Jack. Starting with Message 8. I don't see why not.

I think he also presented an argument that he is referring to free will as the capacity to make decisions, and so did a little more than simply saying 'they are too compatible' If the choices you make are not determined by your will, how can your will be held accountable? Moreover, 'I don't see why not' is equivalent to 'nuh-uh they are too' in quality of argument.Edited by Modulous, : No reason given.

There is no contradiction because we are part of the universe, specifically the part making the choice. That choice is partially independent of the external conditions leading up to it. There is literally no way to determine which choice will be made without reference to our selves.What on earth do you think is making the choice if not us?

Okay, fine. He did "a little"... How did we get to our choices not being determined by our will? That would be the completely deterministic one, not the free will one. I was answering a direct (ill-directed) question, not asserting claims.

Wow. I don't see how that does anything at all to reconcile the contradition, or even address it really, nor can I figure out how you got to that suggesting that I think it is not us who is making the choice.You're simply failing to effectively communicate with me. And from my point of view, your performance in this thread has been piss poor and hardly efforted. "I bow out! I wash my hands!"

When you proposed that our choices were not determined by anything that would seem to include 'the will'.

Perhaps you could explain what you think the contradiction is, because I don't see any. You've claimed determinism means we're not choosing. So how is the choice getting made? Are you claiming that "I chose the pink shirt" has literally no meaning? What? The feeling, my friend, is very much mutual.

I'm not followin' ya Are you referring to the "conscious nondeterministic actually-reality-affecting decision making going on"?

I'm unable to make it more explicit than I have. Its simply the inevitable result of the conditions leading up to it, like a string of dominoes, instead of being effected by your conscious decision-making ability. In this context, it means that if the universe was reran, then the outcome could be you wearing a different shirt, but this time your conscious decision-making ability effcted the result of the universe partially independent of the conditions leading up to the point where you "make the decision" on what shirt you're going to wear (unlike a string of dominoes).So, in one sense its like a string of dominoes and in the other its not like a string of dominoes.Are you capable of seeing a contradiction between "like a string of dominoes" and "not like a string of dominoes"?

Yes, specifically the nondeterministic part. The part where reality is affected by something that is not determined by something else. And thus the something else (in this specific case we are calling it 'will') cannot be held to be a proximate cause of the change in reality, and therefore cannot be held morally accountable for any consequences for said change.