Is there any indication of increased intellegence over time within the Human species?

Hi JavaMan, thanks for the reply. I didn't say that they're equivalent, I said that making a distinction between them is probably a "bad move." It means, I don't think it's the best distinction for modelling / explaining the data. There's a big difference between saying this and saying they're equivalent. What justification do you have to say this is due to "hard-wiring" that makes him "innately better" at solving problems? How could you differentiate this in someobody so old? There's so many confounding factors in a brain so old. And guess what? A lot of those confounding factors can be classified as some kind of "knowledge". Clearly, according to jar's definition, you are justified in saying this. But the real question is... is it a good way to model the world? In other words, does it hold any explanatory value? Predictive value? Isn't that how we should judge whether or not a model is good?From an explanatory point of view, I think slapping the label "intelligent" here just labels many possible causes, causes that aren't related. For example, it could be due to:
- knowledge in another domain, and then using skills (problem-solving techniques, modelling techniques, cognitive skills) from the other domain to help solve problems this domain.
- could be from practice, experience, or "innate" abilities to visualize.
- could be from practice, experience, or "innate" abilities related to working memory.
- could be that one has an interest in cultures and arts, and is able to apply what s/he's seen from that domain into the carpentry.
Really, this list can go on and on. There's TONS of ways this could happen.All these things would manifest could themselves in this example you gave. What's the use of labelling them all "intelligent" ?And because the root causes are all different, the predictions of what other things this person woudl be good at, or what things they wouldn't be good at, are all different as well. So this "intelligence" doesn't hold explanatory OR predictive powers. Why use it? And... I don't get what your point is here. The difference here is one of knowledge, not intelligence... so why do you bring it up? I don't see how it addresses your point (or, for that matter, mine). There's all sorts of knowledge out there... ok. And?Hope this all makes some sense and we can move forward off it.Thanks!
BenEdited to change subtitle. Moose, I hope you're watchin' babyThis message has been edited by Ben, Friday, 2005/08/12 06:52 AM

Granted. Sorry for the misrepresentation.However, I don't quite understand why you have a problem with the word 'intelligent'. Within this thread we're using it on the understanding that what we mean by it is 'problem solving abilities'. So when I say that someone is more intelligent than someone else I simply mean they have better problem solving skills. (Problem solving being one of the standard areas of research in modern cognitive science). I'm not making a claim, I'm asking a question, i.e. if one person is better at solving problems than another, is that because their brains are hard-wired in a particular way, or is it because they have some knowledge the other person doesn't have?This question isn't trivial. In fact, it's been the cause of controversy for well over a century. Scientific opinion has been, and still is divided, and scientific fashion (and public policy) has tended to drift first one way, then another. Until the 1970s in England, for example, the 'hard-wired intelligence' theory held sway. The state education system was split into two tiers and children were assigned to one tier or the other based on whether they passed a national IQ test at age 11. During the 60s and 70s the scientific orthodoxy changed and the theory of 'hard-wired intelligence' fell out of fashion. Public policy followed the scientific fashion and by the end of the 1970s, the national selective system in England was abolished.It's a question that interests me because, as a child of the 70s, my bias has always been against the notion of hard-wired intelligence. But the more I learn about the brain, the less likely it seems that there isn't at least some hard-wiring of problem-solving abilities. The various types of autism, for example, are caused by faulty hard-wiring; schizophrenia seems to be at least partly caused by faulty wiring. Is it such a leap, then, to suggest that some element of problem-solving ability might be hard-wired and that the effectiveness of this wiring varies across the human population? Surely whether a term or concept has explanatory or predictive power depends on what level you're working at. At the level of brain chemistry, clearly the term 'intelligence' has no explanatory or predictive power, but at the level of behaviour it certainly has.It is useful because it distinguishes a particular subset of cognitive abilities, i.e. 'problem solving skills' rather than 'object recognition', say, or 'language understanding'. It provides us with a useful category label for this set of skills.As to explanatory and predictive power, suppose we want to investigate the question, 'How is it that some children in my class are better at solving problems than other children'. According to our 'hard-wired intelligence' model the reason why the children have differential problem solving abilities is because, to a certain extent, those skills are hard-wired and this limits their ability to learn and to apply learned knowledge. On the other hand our 'intelligence is knowledge' model suggests that the difference is due to differences in acquired knowledge.Clearly, given these two models we can make predictions about what will happen to the childrens' problem solving abilities under different conditions, and because we can make predictions we can test the models. Mmm...yes, sorry, I think I got carried away and started arguing about something you wrote in another thread...just put it down to the wiring getting crossed!

---

The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible

JavaMan,OK, I understand you better now. Thanks for working through that. I'm going to push my previous ideas a bit more; I hope this isn't simply redundant. And my exact point is, 'problem solving abilities' are so dependent on knowledge, I can't make any sense of "problem solving abilities sans knowledge." Honestly. Right now I'm studying "Distributed Cognition", introduced by Dr. Ed Hutchins at UCSD. It's all about how, at the behavioral level, you can't separate knowledge, artifacts, culture, etc. out of the analysis of problem solving. Can't. We are "living cyborgs". Absolutely not. I think that it's probable. But hard-wiring manifests itself at the neurological level; I think it's a real stretch to try to find a direct link to the behavioral level. I can believe in hard-wiring that allows for faster neuronal firing, faster onset of long-term potentiation, etc. But promoting any of those directly up to "problem-solving abilities" seems to be... throwing out an all-inclusive term.And this is how I get back to predictabiltiy. At the behavioral level, I think you get very little power out of the label "intelligence". It covers such a diverse range of neural and behavioral phenomena... for example, see the list I gave before. Maybe if you give "general" intelligence tests, ones that test basically ALL POSSIBLE ways to be "more intelligent", you'll get hits; but the hits will tell you very little about the special powers of any person; just that they have "something." Oops... I talked abou this before reading your comment, but I think what I said above works.I just think "intelligence" is a weak concept based on untenable premises. I think it's better to work with "intelligence" and "knowledge" together. This comes from the cognitive studies I've done here at UCSD, but also from a friend who teaches using the "interactive teaching" method, using "concepTests" instead of a classically lecture-style class. He says the classically "less intelligent" students aren't unteachable at all--in general, they just needed a different teaching style to engage them. he says intelligence is a bad way to measure a student, that things do not divide along those lines.There's much more powerful ways to do it. Let's test based on cognitive-level tasks. Let's test based on knowledge. Heck, IQ tests even now have everything to do with knowledge. It's basically a strategy-based test. If you have experience with the strategies, you'll do great. If you don't, you get hammered. To move on... let's test using EEG and fMRI samplings.As to explanatory and predictive power, suppose we want to investigate the question, 'How is it that some children in my class are better at solving problems than other children'. According to our 'hard-wired intelligence' model the reason why the children have differential problem solving abilities is because, to a certain extent, those skills are hard-wired and this limits their ability to learn and to apply learned knowledge. On the other hand our 'intelligence is knowledge' model suggests that the difference is due to differences in acquired knowledge.

Problem solving skills is measured only in what they are applied toward... which doesn't preserve in the fossil record. In a sense, they are moot, despite being so bloody interesting.That being said, the argument that our brains aren't hard wired is.... ach.. ridiculous. There is no evidence for it in cultural diversity or in performance. We aren't very plastic people. Don't get me wrong... I used to be on the other side of the camp coming from hippie parents. But the data has been drawn out. For particularly excellent treatment, check out Synaptic Self by Joseph LeDoux and The Blank Slate by Stephen Pinker.John Locke's "Tabula Rasa" was written in binary all along. The genetic variation seen in humans reflects the difference in personalitise in humans. This makes since evolutionarily... how could any personality traits evol without natural selection... how could selection work on indefinite traits?However, an excellent point has been made by JavaMan in that the concepts of human nature, even in the scientific literature, is still bound to the cultural views of the time. As such, it waxes and wanes between the two poles of nature and nurture. However, the answer to all of this is simple. Nurture cannot act outside the constraints of nature, and any nurture must feedback into a hard-wired system. No if, ands, or buts.

---

Veri Omni Veritas

Ben,I've been thinking about this for two days now, on your question related to plants in general I had original proposed that the basic elements of intelligence would be: (which I had expected some comments on regarding similarity to the scientific method)We can now also call "2. storage (of data)" knowledge, to bring it into the discourse on the {intelligence\knowledge} spectrum issue.And it seems to me that we need to (possibly) distinguish between two (or more) levels of intelligence, based on how they {exist\operate}:(1) the {individual} level, where perception, storage, evaluation, theory and testing all occur with the one individual (albeit can include perception of historic data by communications)(2) a {species\life} level, where individuals may only be needed for one or two elements (perception, testing), but data, say, is recorded in an {external} databank (DNA), theorizing is done by shotgun approach (variations caused by mutations), while evaluation and testing is done by an {external} mechanism {survival\sexual selection}In the second sense on can argue that the {process of life} is intelligent, as it fulfills the requirements in a broad sense while asking very little of its littlest participants.Plants, bacteria, and jellyfish certainly qualify as participants in the intelligence of life (and thus the (lowercase) intelligent design of life), but not (necessarily) on the individual level. And there may be gray areas from different degrees in {individualizing} the elements.(*)So are we talking individuals or species or {life in general}?Thanks.ps -- jar: maybe this should be in ID forum? This message has been edited by RAZD, 08*13*2005 10:09 AM

---

we are limited in our ability to understand
by our ability to understand RebelAAmerican.Zen[Deist
{{{Buddha walks off laughing with joy}}}

Hey RAZD,I think your point is an excellent one. And I'm glad my question made you think for a bit--I've had to stop and think for days after reading some of your posts before, for sure.As I mentioned to JavaMan in another post, I'm in a class about Distributed Cognition (DC)--a way to study cognition and mind which spreads over individuals and artifacts, both over space and time. I think your post really highlights the central concern of DC. That's cool, and I think it's a really important point. Sometimes analyzing things at the individual level gives us the wrong picture of reality, or doesn't even make sense. Anyway, I'll get back to your question in a bit. Your formulation of intelligence is very ... classical AI to me. I mean, it's very clean, engineered, and structured. Personally I'm more on the "AL" side; I believe that models that are {very integrated, use a "bag-of-tricks"-type solutions (rather than procedural and engineered), and are based in computational "tricks"} are more promising in their ability to describe reality and the interactions.(I just finished reading "Mindware" by Andy Clark; if you're interested in why I take my position, I'd recommend checking that book out. It's kind of "history of cognitive science" stuff. Not too bad of a read, as far as time. I recommend the book because... outlining the thoughts here... I couldn't come close to getting it right. I'm just not sophisticated enough in this stuff yet.)Anyway, I didn't want to comment on your model directly, because it doesn't fit with my thinking on many different levels. So I thought it wouldn't be at all constructive to make direct comments like that. BUT...I thought it would be useful for both of us to discuss the results of your model. That way we can see it's strengths and weaknesses, and both of us can learn from it without getting into REALLY philosophical and high-level talks about cognitive science in general.ANYWAY My comment was focused on an individual plant, but you're right--it definitely can be reformulated in terms of species.I guess a general comment about the classifications of your model: if you accept 3(a and b) and 4 being non-conscious (I think we can only justify humans being able to do those things consciously, and maybe we'd even fail for humans too), (and I'd suggest you really need to make 3's and 4 apply non-consciously), then I think your model is going to have to accept a lot of computational things that we wouldn't normally consider intelligent.Seems to me anything we consider life has these properties. Many robots and programs have these properties. I might even think things like tectonic plates, rocks, flowing water... does a river have these properties? It perceives & evaluates a blockage, theorizes and tests by trying to move around an obstacle (or, if it fails, it may try to flow over it), and stores information by carving a path that shows the "easiest" path available.... this post is getting a bit long, but I'll keep going for a bit more.If these processes (1-5) need not be conscious, then it is only a question of behavior, and if the behavior is consistent with the processes. Dennett really holds this position firmly; that's also described in Mindware quite a bit.Ok, I'll stop for now. By the way, I don't mean to imply that you need to read a book or anything; just that its' something that I read recently which describes many things I think are applicable to this question and your formulation of intelligence. I hope I'm not coming off the wrong way here.Take it easy,
Ben

yep on both sides. throw holmes in that mix too. For the individual model, I don't think of it as a linear progression so much as one of "irreducible complexity" and threshold limitations. Without all parts there is a breakdown in the process. There is a difference between knowing that sunlight is warm on a cold morning and knowing which side of the hill gets sunlight sooner.The answer for the {species\life} model is a little more difficult, in part from looking at it in a different angle. Artificial Life models are interesting. I'm not sure that a I follow your model use of {Loki\Raven\Mxyzptlk} factors as necessary for them to {evolve intelligent solutions} rather than some form of random generator and selection process. Perhaps I misunderstand. Great, a summer reading list ...
seriously though I will look it up in the library. Any relation to Arthur C? we are (generally) agreed here But I'm not sure that rocks and water exhibit perception or reaction (they don't choose to change direction). Water seems to only have one solution ...And I don't think we can limit conscious intelligence to humans: certainly have evidence that other species are aware of their actions, from the japanese snow monkey to the silver ring making dolphin to the lock-picking orangutan, and that they teach their "tricks" to the next generation. I believe there was one study of apes that had been taught ASL where they were teaching it to the next generation (and "inventing" some new signs).Certainly for individual intelligence communication is necessary for any lasting benefit, and this fits into your {Distributed Cognition} aspect, where some people know some of the story and other know other parts. Communicated aspects kind of have to be conscious... What's a wrong way?⁽¹⁾ Isn't that what it's all about? Any way that succeeds is not wrong. Any way that leads to new solutions is helpful.⁽¹⁾ ... about 20 lbs ... (with a nod to Rowan and Martin )

---

we are limited in our ability to understand
by our ability to understand RebelAAmerican.Zen[Deist
{{{Buddha walks off laughing with joy}}}

Bad explanation on my part. In class we've been talking about evolutionary solutions being like "a bag of tricks"--just using whatever means is available. That's all I meant. I agree with the way you've outlined it above. No idea about Arthur C, sorry. Mindware was just OK. But it's strength was definitely in explaining the shortcomings of classical AI and symbolic processing, and why embodied models, models in which behavior "emerges" (I hate that word) show promise in overcoming those shortcomings. It concludes with talking about how distributed cognition is the next step. Anyway, if you're familiar with these types of arguments, then skip the book. But if you're not familiar--then I highly recommend it. I think this is peripheral to what we're talking about here. What I really want to know is, do you accept 3a-b and 4 to be applicable to things that are non-conscious? If you do NOT, then we need to delineate what systems are "conscious" and what systems are not.I'll say up front that I think its a valid approach to apply 3a-b and 4 to every system, regardless of the question of "conscious" or .. maybe a better word, "intentional". These reasons come from Daniel Dennett. Anyway, I'll wait before going further, to see where you stand. I would define "perception" as "interaction with the external world."
I would define "reaction" as "changing behavior due to perception."With these ultra-general definitions, it works.As for water having one solution... yeah, you have to choose how far you're willing to go with hard determinism. I don't see plant or animal behavior to be fundamentally different, so I think what you say actually argues in my favor. River "behavior" is not fundamentally different than other "behavior." Well... I'm not sure if this is going to randomize us away from the thread, but I disagree. Examples of group behavior that depends on "communication" between individuals include flocking behavior, nest-building in ants, even neural networks... any system where "intelligent" group behavior derives from a (usually small) finite set of local rules.Not sure if I'm understanding you right though. Please correct me if I'm misunderstanding on that.Thanks!
Ben

Works for me I'm not very. At least you didn't say behavior "evidences itself" or some other such "modern" nonsense I do, certainly I would have a hard time delineating the boundary between {concious\unconcious} in any other species. intent can be observed (the orangutan fu manchu hiding the wire in his lip pocket so he can pick the compound door at night when the guards aren't around). Perhaps that shows that the ultra-general definitions are too general? I have difficulty assigning intelligence to rocks and water (although to be sure, the Japanese grow rock gardens ... and I've seen people with bowls of water for a table centerpiece ... ) For intelligence at an individual level to have any permanence (rather than just be a flash in the pan) it has to be {transfered\transmitted\communicated} to other individuals. Flocking and nest building would certainly apply, and would provide a base for further development of such {behavior\skills\benefits\knowledge} I'm just thinking that a {Distributed Cognition} network needs to have {information\ability\knowledge} disbursed but available and that this requires some way of communication -- whether it is chemical (feeding cells?) or electrical (neurons) -- to organize if nothing else.

---

we are limited in our ability to understand
by our ability to understand RebelAAmerican.Zen[Deist
{{{Buddha walks off laughing with joy}}}

The storage and manipulation of knowledge is obviously an important component in problem solving, but there are other equally important components such as attention and planning.If we want to understand problem solving abilities in humans or animals we need to investigate all of these areas, not just focus on knowledge. If two children have differences in problem-solving ability, for example, is it because they have different knowledge (or different knowledge acquisition skills), or is it because they have different abilities to block out distractions, or different skills in planning the approach to a problem? And when we've answered this question we still have the further question, Can we overcome these knowledge/attention/planning differences by training, or are they hard-wired in some way?Returning to the topic of this thread, one of the questions we're asking is, What is it about the human brain that makes humans better at problem solving than chimpanzees? From the evidence of your previous messages I'd guess your answer might contain the word 'knowledge'. However, it has been suggested that the thing that really gives humans the edge, when it comes to problem solving, is attention, i.e. the ability to filter out distracting sensory input. An amusing example of this ability is the famous Gorillas in Our Midst experiment performed by Dan Simons at the University of Illinois in the 1990s.For those who haven't heard about this experiment, here's a brief description. A group of subjects were asked to watch a video of a basketball game and count the number of passes one team made. During the game a woman dressed in a gorilla costume walks into the frame, turns to face the camera, beats her breast a few times, then walks off. Amazingly, half of the subjects watching this film don't see the gorilla at all - they're so focused on the task they've been set that they're effectively blind to it. Gorillas in Our Midst
Videos of the experimentsAccording to at least one animal behaviourist (Temple Grandin, Animals in Translation) this inattentional blindness is something peculiar to humans. Animals, even higher primates like chimpanzees, simply don't have the neural architecture to inhibit their sensory inputs in such a radical way. Temple Grandin

---

The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible

quote:

---

Surely whether a term or concept has explanatory or predictive power depends on what level you're working at. At the level of brain chemistry, clearly the term 'intelligence' has no explanatory or predictive power, but at the level of behaviour it certainly has.

---

Are you so sure or are you just "aping" the literature? I know for myself that in 1979 I CLEARLY had the thought that kinase phosphorlation was associated with MY OWN memory retention. In high school I took on an independent study in chemsitry where I speculated into that THOUGHT a way that the brain might resonate with gravity waves by wiggling protein side chains in membrane ion channels. After I got to Cornell I could not discount the possiblity that gravity via dissipatives might not contain enough force accumulatable not by morphic resonance of Sheldrake but via unknown truth of quantum gravity to, in today's lingo, enable "distributive" knowledge no matter what diffusive peptides might change electrically at synapses and in ontogeny. Since Georgi Gladyshev began corresponding to me via EVC this thinking can be demonstrably shown to be naive but still with another level IN BETWEEN atom and macromolecule that Dr. Gladyshev in truth contributes to France's Lehn etc (who only lectured at Cornell in 1988)I can in NO WAY say that there is no explanatory power at the level of brain chemistry given all that I know. Yes there is a leap from the negative distortions of phenotypes to the positive indicator often called "intelligence".This message has been edited by Brad McFall, 08-18-2005 09:35 AM

Is there any indication? Yes, there is. Observe the tools used.

I hope gravity waves aren't affecting my memory! (Although it could explain a few things).I wasn't saying that 'intelligence' couldn't affect brain chemistry (although I'd need a fair bit of evidence to accept that claim), I was just saying that for someone investigating the structure of neural membranes, say, or the binding effect of neurotransmitters, the term 'intelligence' isn't very useful. Obviously if you could prove that external 'intelligence' can affect the chemistry of the brain, that would be a different matter!

---

The true mystery of the world is the visible, not the invisible

or increased knowledge?

---

Aslan is not a Tame Lion

It takes intelligence to invent better tools. Or where do you think the tools come from?(Fascinatingly, there's evidence of what might be a Neanderthal culture that tried to learn how to make Cro Magnon tools but couldn't master them - can't remember the name of it though, will try to remember to look it up)