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Author Topic:   Why "Immaterial Pink Unicorns" are not a logical argument
xongsmith
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Posts: 2578
From: massachusetts US
Joined: 01-01-2009
Member Rating: 6.8


Message 301 of 304 (506556)
04-27-2009 2:10 PM
Reply to: Message 300 by Straggler
04-24-2009 8:56 AM


Re: Time to Close Folks
from RAZD: If you believe in something without evidence, then you should believe in any other thing without evidence.
The question that you need to ask is NOT why you should believe in the IPU but instead why it is that other equally unevidenced concepts that you DO believe in (e.g. deities) are deserving of any less atheism from others than the degree of atheism that you apply to the IPU. You have completely failed to answer this question.
first off, RAZD's statement 1 quoted above doesnt make logical sense.
it is not a reverse analog of the logic in
1. If you believe in something with evidence, then you should believe in any other thing with evidence.
it's more like: "If you cannot start a clock by touching it, then you can start it by not touching it." - from one of RAZD's favorite books.
but it's not that either.
1. If you believe in something with evidence, then you should believe in any other thing with evidence.
this statement contains a bird's nest of assumed and acceptable definitions for "evidence". we can probably discount out of hand someone believing in something completely aside from whether or not it has evidence. no, the belief must be because of the evidence, i would think. we can probably assume that the evidence in question is compelling and convincing, implying the observer has an internal construct of conditional constraints that lead to the conclusion that the evidence is compelling and convincing. this construct supercedes the mere strength of subjective belief. it's on a higher rung. then a venn diagram works here. belief would be subserviant to this construct.
if you believe in something without evidence, and again this evidence would be of the compelling and convincing kind, then you have dropped down a rung in your standards to consider subjective evidence. once you have done that, you no longer are required, as you would be with your internal construct, to believe in any other thing without evidence. the construct is not in play anymore. it's not on the same higher rung anymore. the venn diagram wont work here.
i think RAZD is saying that that does not necessarily put it on the bottom rung. i think Straggler is looking for those intermediate rungs from RAZD and hasnt seen compelling and convincing evidence that RAZD has provided them.
maybe another thread........
*gleep*

- xongsmith

This message is a reply to:
 Message 300 by Straggler, posted 04-24-2009 8:56 AM Straggler has not replied

Admin
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Message 302 of 304 (506603)
04-27-2009 7:37 PM


Thread Closing Now
Thanks for participating, everyone!

--Percy
EvC Forum Director

Replies to this message:
 Message 303 by RAZD, posted 04-29-2009 11:29 PM Admin has not replied

RAZD
Member (Idle past 1405 days)
Posts: 20714
From: the other end of the sidewalk
Joined: 03-14-2004


Message 303 of 304 (506870)
04-29-2009 11:29 PM
Reply to: Message 302 by Admin
04-27-2009 7:37 PM


Re: Thread Closing Now
Thanks Percy for the opportunity to summarize my position. I think this thread has been valuable for me, as it has served to formalize some concepts I've been mulling about for a while -- how to deal with concepts outside the realms of science and testability. Some of this has likely resulted in some evolution of my position thru this thread, and I'd like to thank those who have participated, and helped even though we disagree.
In message 297 the task was summarized for proponents of the IPU as a logical argument:
quote:
Your task is to summarize in one or two paragraphs why this is a logical argument on it's own value.
Curiously, this has (still) not been done.
The conclusion I reach is that this argument does not stand on it's own, and really has no logical justification.
Instead, we get arguments that just claim that it "works" --
The IPU works as a hypothetical construct for unknown but conceived entities, & there is no reliable evidence that any exists.
In other words, it "works" when compared to pure fiction, or what one considers to be pure fiction. Some examples of such pure fiction include Russel's Teapot and Dawkin's Garage Dragon. Concepts that have consciously been developed as fictions. It works when you have already made up your mind that what you compare it to is pure fiction.
I made this suggestion to help people see the fallacies involved:
quote:
Let's see if it helps by making this semi-inversion comparison:
The argument usually goes something like this:
  1. If you believe in something due to evidence, then you should believe in any other thing due to evidence.
  2. There is evidence that the earth orbits the sun.
    therefore, you should believe the earth orbits the sun or admit that you don't believe in something due to evidence.
You will note that the logical structure here is valid.
Strangely, nobody contested this last statement. The logical result of this argument is that if you believe that alien life on other planets is possible, due to life on earth, then you should equally believe that alien visitations are possible, due to life on earth.
Instead, we get arguments about the nature of evidence, and the amount of evidence that is necessary, before one believes the evidence -- or what is known as special pleading of one situation versus another ... if the logical structure is indeed valid. The alternative is that these arguments are valid, and the logical structure is flawed or one of it's precepts is false. This too, invalidates the IPU argument.
this statement contains a bird's nest of assumed and acceptable definitions for "evidence".
And therein lies the problem: what IS evidence?
When discussing evidence, the position I have put forward, is that subjective evidence can be viewed as possibly true. Such experience differs from pure fiction because it is experienced, it is "real" to the person having the experience, rather than a conscious construction.
Because of this difference, the IPU argument fails to apply to such situations.
As several people have conceded, having a subjective experience is sufficient grounds for believing the experience: someone who claims to have subjective evidence of a "shooting star" meteor is entitled to believe they saw a "shooting star" meteor based on their subjective experience. Someone who claims to have subjective evidence of an alien visitation is entitled to believe they saw an alien visitation based on their subjective experience. Believing such evidence is not special pleading, as it is founded on the subjective experience.
Curiously, subjective experience is how we experience the world. The sum of our individual subjective experiences is what forms our personal world view: our individual concept of reality.
My position has been misinterpreted or misunderstood. Some of these misrepresentations need to be addressed to fully understand my position, because they demonstrate part of the issue at hand: what is evidence and how do you interpret it?
All experience is subjective, it is experienced through senses and then filtered by one's world view to conform to our individual concept of reality. Unfortunately, humans are not recording machines, we are unable to "play back" an experience for someone else, and our memory of events is not perfect. What we have is an experience, and then we have a "story" that we develop to explain the experience, and what we remember is the story, rather than the experience. This is why subjective evidence in courts is problematical: it may be true, or it may be a story.
In discussions of the value of evidence, I'm told that I "conflate "could occur" with "has occurred"" and this is another misrepresentation of my argument: "possibly true" does not mean "has occurred" -- any claim that I've said "has occurred" or even implied it, is false.
What we see here is a "story" developed from reading my posts filtered through someone else's world view, where it is turned into something they believe is true, but isn't.
Strangely, I'm also told I have contradicted myself on deities, yet (objectively) I don't see how I can contradict myself on concepts not discussed: I have not discussed deities on this thread. It may seem strange, but the fact that I declared deities off-topic means that I intended to discuss the topic without reference to deities, and in fact have done that.
Again, what we see here is a "story" developed from reading my posts filtered through someone else's world view, where it is turned into something they believe is true, but isn't.
Then I'm told that I am evading the topic of deities by noting that the continued raising of this issue is (still) off topic.
Ignoring the rather humorous contradiction this raises between my contradicting myself discussing deities, and avoiding the issue on deities, it is NOT evasion to insist on the topic being discussed stay on topic as defined in the opening post.
What is interesting is the persistence of people in continually trying to bring deities into the discussion: why does this occur when one of the stated objectives of the topic is to avoid such a discussion? It seems to me that more than half of this thread has been taken up trying to inject deities into the discussion.
The conclusion I reach is that the IPU seems to be inextricably linked in some people's minds with deities, and that to discuss one is to de facto discuss the other. Again, we see the effect of the world view on the evidence: the "story" attached to the IPU concept is that it deals with deities, discuss one and you think the discussion involves deities.
Finally, I'm told that I fail to see a distinction between subjective experience of objective reality and "wholly subjective evidence (i.e. where there is no objective evidence to interpret)" ... and I find this to be conceptually problematic, and an unrealistic distinction:
How does one distinguish where one leaves off and the other continues? One can have a subjective experience that may be of objective reality, but you just don't know it from the experience, and "there is no available objective evidence to interpret" ... so is it a "subjective experience of objective reality" or is it "wholly subjective evidence (i.e. where there is no objective evidence to interpret)"? How does one know without assuming that one knows a priori what is reality and what is not? My conclusion is that this is not a black and white dichotomy, but a spectrum, a set of rungs, a blending from one to the other.
At one end of the spectrum we have what is considered objective evidence of reality, where many people have had the same or similar experiences, where experiences can be repeated and tested. Where there is so much evidence, so much commonality of experience, so much logical and rational consistency that to disbelieve is considered irrational, delusional, insane. That the earth orbits the sun, is such a concept.
At this end of the spectrum lies science, focused on what can be repeated and tested, where concepts can be invalidated when objective reality contradicts the concept, or predictions based on the concept. Observing the sun rise and the progression of seasons, and knowing this is due to the rotation of the earth, the orbit around the sun and the inclination of the axis of spin to the plane of the orbit, all falls in this general area of the spectrum. Counting tree rings and determining that the earth is more than 5,000 years old falls in this general area of the spectrum.
What we see is that with science, there is repeatability, and commonality of experience, that validates the process (and the results) for people's beliefs about reality that include these concepts.
Outside this lies concepts based on extrapolations from this base of objective reality that is known from science, but that are not themselves testable, not invalidatable concepts. Alien life on other planets falls in this general area of the spectrum. Being the only person to see a "falling star" meteor falls in this general area of the spectrum.
What we see here, is that there is logic and a commonality of similar experiences, that explains the process (and the results) for people's beliefs about reality that include these concepts.
Outside this lies concepts based on subjective experiences, where links to objective evidence are not available. Alien visitations falls on this rung of the spectrum.
What we see here, is that there is a commonality of similar experiences, a similarity of experience that reinforces the process, and the results, for people's beliefs about reality that include these concepts.
This, to my mind, is the limit that can be reached for arguments based on reasons, evidences, logics, and consistencies, and that in all these cases the IPU argument fails to apply. In all these cases there are valid reasons for believing these concepts about reality, whether such beliefs are true or not (from science to space aliens) is immaterial to the fact that there is a basis for belief, that these experiences occurred.
Thus, having covered the extent of arguments that involve logic, and finding that the IPU argument does not apply to any of them, the conclusion I reach is that the IPU is not a logical argument of any real value.
If the only purpose is to show that non-logical concepts are not logical, then the IPU serves no logical purpose there either. It cannot sway someone who believes a non-logical concept, for the simple reason that there is no logic involved.
I prefer blues and greens to pinks and purples. There is no logic in that preference, it is just part of me. You cannot sway me to think that I should find that pink is a preferable color. Different people have different preferences, and it is entirely possible to have a set of concepts where there is no "correct" concept.
When such a non-logical concept is not contradicted by all the known evidence of reality, it is not irrational, and the IPU will prove useless in convincing a believer that it is bizarre or insane, because there is no logic involved in the belief.
It does not matter how many immaterial pink unicorns can dance on the head of a pin, it is not a logical argument. There is a spectrum of possibilities, and there are many aspects of reality that cannot be ruled out, just because they do not seem probable to some people.
Enjoy.
Edited by RAZD, : sway

we are limited in our ability to understand
by our ability to understand
Rebel American Zen Deist
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This message is a reply to:
 Message 302 by Admin, posted 04-27-2009 7:37 PM Admin has not replied

Replies to this message:
 Message 304 by Rahvin, posted 04-30-2009 12:22 AM RAZD has seen this message but not replied

Rahvin
Member
Posts: 4032
Joined: 07-01-2005
Member Rating: 9.2


Message 304 of 304 (506874)
04-30-2009 12:22 AM
Reply to: Message 303 by RAZD
04-29-2009 11:29 PM


Re: Thread Closing Now
It does not matter how many immaterial pink unicorns can dance on the head of a pin, it is not a logical argument. There is a spectrum of possibilities, and there are many aspects of reality that cannot be ruled out, just because they do not seem probable to some people.
And in your summation, you once again demonstrate that the entire argument is going over your head.
This isn't about ruling out a possibility, or even about probability. The IPU argument is about demonstrating the special pleading required to have confidence in one unsupported possibility, while not having confidence in any other unsupported possibility, despite the lack of any objective and relevant difference between the chosen possibility and others like the IPU.
You have confidence that your unsupported possibility (the existence of an undefined "deity") is valid - you believe it to be true.
You do not have confidence that the IPU is valid - you do not beleive it to be true.
The two possibilities (your deity and the IPU) are functionally identical in that they are unfalsifiable, supernatural entities supported by no evidence whatsoever. You have confidence in one without having any evidence-grounded reason for doing so, and you do not have confidence in the other. You are engaged in special pleading.
It doesn't matter how many deities can dance on the head of a pin either, RAZD. The IPU argument is perfectly valid for demonstrating the sort of special pleading you have attempted to justify throughout this debate.

This message is a reply to:
 Message 303 by RAZD, posted 04-29-2009 11:29 PM RAZD has seen this message but not replied

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