You suggest that not believing in Nessie is rational by answering true to that question. Then it is rational the second time too, right?
Yes, both those chips are blue.
Yet I have said numerous times that it is a belief. It's the type of belief that the statements are probing. Is it a rational belief or is it a belief centred around faith? Those are the options.
False dichotomy, all beliefs are part faith, and we have already established that we are talking about rational beliefs. The question is how you decide between different rational beliefs.
The standard set in question 10 and reinforced in question 14 is that an absence of compelling arguments or evidence contrary to your belief makes it a rational choice.
14a: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, atheism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
14b: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
Both those chips have the same blueness.
These statements use the same rationality, but come to different conclusions. These statements use the same evidence, but come to different conclusions. Therefore the conclusions reached are not due to the rationality of the process or the evidence used, but to the belief\faith of the person making the conclusion: they are a matter of belief rather than the rationality of the process.
Both chips are blue. Blueness is not the factor used to decide which one you like better. Not using blueness to decide doesn't make the chips change color, they are still blue.
Someone using blueness to decide between the two chips would find them both equally blue, both equally valid choices: they would be agnostic. When you choose one chip over the other, the choice is based on some belief that one is a better choice than the other, not the blueness of the chips.
If not believing in Nessie is a rational belief so is not believing in God. If not believing in Nessie is not a rational belief then neither is not believing in God.
And those are not the only options. It is equally rational to believe in god, based on the criteria set here for what is rational: the lack compelling arguments or evidence that contradicts the belief.
Choosing one blue chip over the other is a matter of some other preference, not blueness.
And that depends on the definition of faith in play. The context implies the dichotomy definition and I see no reason to ignore that context. I am not sure why you continue to explain your position to me, since I already understand it.
Are you disinterested in trying to understand my position?
they are a matter of belief rather than the rationality of the process.
That's not a problematic position to take - but my point is that if it is not a matter of rationality in statement 14, then it isn't a matter of rationality in statement 10, either. In statement 10, you think that choosing blue is rational, but it becomes a matter of faith, not rationality in statement 14.
And that depends on the definition of faith in play. The context implies the dichotomy definition and I see no reason to ignore that context.
It's part of the definition of belief:
Both belief2 and belief3 require the acceptance of the belief as being true whether it is or not. Thus all beliefs are part faith, whether they are "rational beliefs" or not. We also see that rational in this context is just needs to be a belief consistent with reason:
Because it is not based on proof it is just a matter of consistency with other beliefs to be a rational belief. This is established further in questions 10 and 14 by using the lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other to determine the rationality of the belief.
Are you disinterested in trying to understand my position?
You seem to be saying that 14 is only asking whether the choice is rational, so you only see rationality as the criteria, rather than any element of faith. It seems to me that you can only hold this view by being blind to other equally rational options.
Apply your criteria to this version:
14b: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
Or this one:
14c: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
We apply the same standard for rationality from 10 and 14 - the lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other - to determine the rationality of the belief.
We then apply the same definition of faith - belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence - to exclude all rational beliefs from the faith2 category.
Thus you should say both these statements are also false, because these are also rational beliefs and thus they don't qualify as faith2 (Belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence).
We now have 14a - atheism - and 14b/c - theism - both as conclusions based on rationality rather than faith, so how do we then get to atheism between those choices by rationality alone?
In statement 10, you think that choosing blue is rational, but it becomes a matter of faith, not rationality in statement 14.
No, in the analogy blue == rational. In 10 the question is only whether the chip is blue or not. The chip does not lose blueness in 14. It is just as blue in 14 as it was in 10. In 10 we are only concerned with blueness, in 14 we are concerned with choices between equally blue chips.
Both belief2 and belief3 require the acceptance of the belief as being true whether it is or not. Thus all beliefs are part faith, whether they are "rational beliefs" or not.
Yes, for certain definitions of faith. No, for others. The context implies that it is contrasting rational beliefs with faith based beliefs. There is no need to insert the idea that technically rational beliefs are also based on epistemological or metaphysical faith - that is already taken care of in the word 'belief'.
You seem to be saying that 14 is only asking whether the choice is rational, so you only see rationality as the criteria, rather than any element of faith. It seems to me that you can only hold this view by being blind to other equally rational options.
I know that if not believing Nessie exists is rational so is not believing in God. So when a statement says that not believing in god is not rational I have to say 'false'. Being a true/false statement implies that there is only one criteria to judge it by hence we should understand it to mean faith in the sense of 'the opposite of rationality'.
Apply your criteria to this version:
14b: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
First we need to add an equivalent 10b:
quote:10b: If, despite years of trying, no strong evidence or argument has been presented to show that there is a Loch Ness monster, it is rational to believe that such a monster exists.
To which I say: false. Then
quote:14b: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
To which I say: true.
We apply the same standard for rationality from 10 and 14 - the lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other - to determine the rationality of the belief.
So for number 10b, we conclude that it is not rational since there is a lack of compelling argument.
We then apply the same definition of faith - belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence - to exclude all rational beliefs from the faith2 category.
And for 14b we see that theism is belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence so it is faith.
14c: As long as there are no compelling arguments or evidence that show that God does not exist, theism is a matter of faith, not rationality.
quote:10c: If, despite years of trying, no strong evidence or argument has been presented to show that there is no Loch Ness monster, it is rational to believe that such a monster exists.
I actually don't think the premises allow for the conclusions here but if I have to answer then, based on the premises 14c is true and 10c is false. It is a matter of faith to believe something exists just because it has not be shown not to. It is not rational to believe something exists just because it has not be shown not to.
The core of the current argument seems to be belief in God vs. belief in the Loc Ness Monster.
Isn't it pretty hard to compare the evidence/lack of evidence/evidence against for something of a pretty specific description and location (Nessie) relative to something of a highly uncertain description and location (God)?
Yes, we believe there is no "monster" in Loc Ness because we have a pretty specific search topic and location, and not only is nothing to be found, the ecology of the Loc is also found to be totally unsuitable to support such a large creature.
On the other hand, in God we are looking for some unclearly defined entity, and we have all the universe (and more?) to look in.
I can't see how a lack of belief in Nessie and a lack of a lack of belief in God is a logical contradiction.
Or perhaps that isn't/wasn't the core question.
I'll now quietly go away.
Moose
Edited by Minnemooseus, : Changed a "to" to "the".
It's a good point and one that I was thinking myself, but I think they address this fairly well in their faq (question 2: That's all very well, you say, but the Loch Ness monster isn't the same kind of thing as God - and, in principle, God is the kind of entity that might forever be beyond our knowledge.)
In essence the answer is that God has been retreating from a concrete position, of someone whose works are clearly evident to someone who is more mystic and transcendent and less detectable. This would be like, they say, Nessians first claiming that there are secret tunnels under Loch Ness that supply food - then claiming that is where Nessie is hiding whenever we SONARd the place. If we drain it, Nessie has an escape route, or is able to dig into the ground and finally Nessie becomes a transcendent spirit that chooses to reveal herself only to those that look with faith to find her.
So for number 10b, we conclude that it is not rational since there is a lack of compelling argument.
In 10a you concluded that it was rational since there was a lack of compelling argument. This is also what both 10 and 14 set as a standard for what is a rational belief - a lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other.
And for 14b we see that theism is belief that does not rest on logical proof or material evidence so it is faith. but if I have to answer then, based on the premises 14c is true and 10c is false.
You have the same definition of faith and belief and rationality, applied the same way. In one you say it is rational in the other you say it is faith.
That is special pleading.
I know that if not believing Nessie exists is rational so is not believing in God. First we need to add an equivalent 10b:
Here you are implying that the evidence against god is equivalent to the evidence against the loch ness monster, rather than applying the standard of evidence given in both 10 and 14 for what is to be considered rational.
It is not rational to believe something exists just because it has not be shown not to.
Why not? Nothing in either question 10 or 14 leads to this conclusion, rather they set a standard for measuring the rationality of the beliefs. This contradicts the standard set for what is a rational belief, and it contradicts what you said earlier -- when I asked if you thought faith = irrational.
you distinguish belief as rational and faith as irrational?
No. I think there are many categories of belief. Some of them are faith-based (Belief that does not rest on logical proof, to quote your dictionary) some of them are rational.
This also is false when you look at instances where things were believed to exist in spite of a lack of compelling evidence or argument for their existence, and later were found to be true.
I repeat Message 63: You seem to be saying that 14 is only asking whether the choice is rational, so you only see rationality as the criteria, rather than any element of faith. It seems to me that you can only hold this view by being blind to other equally rational options.
Isn't it pretty hard to compare the evidence/lack of evidence/evidence against for something of a pretty specific description and location (Nessie) relative to something of a highly uncertain description and location (God)?
Yes. But the point is to define how you determine a rational belief. You could use other examples of "cryptozoology" to the same end.
quote:In the study of cryptozoology, cryptids are animals or creatures that have been hypothesised to exist, but have not been proven to, or animals presumed extinct (known as relicts). Their presumed existence is often derived from anecdotal evidence and/or other evidence insufficient to prove their existence with scientific certainty. Cryptids may also be known as Unidentified Mysterious Animals, or UMA, an intended variation on the term UFO.
Presumably the same logic would hold for all such "hidden animals" -- including ones presumed to be recently extinct, such as the Ivory Billed Woodpecker, but which have been found in spite of lack of evidence for over 60 years. Or other living fossils (Coelacanth, etc).
In all examples of cryptids you have reports of sightings of "something" which then gets embellished as the story/ies are retold.
And it is not like we know all there is to know about species on earth - new species are still being found, some of them rather larger than could be casually overlooked. A new species of deer in Viet Nam, among others.
I can't see how a lack of belief in Nessie and a lack of a lack of belief in God is a logical contradiction.
In 10a you concluded that it was rational since there was a lack of compelling argument. This is also what both 10 and 14 set as a standard for what is a rational belief - a lack of compelling argument or evidence one way or the other.
So, we have established that it is rational to believe something doesn't exist when no compelling argument or evidence has emerged (after a search).
You have the same definition of faith and belief and rationality, applied the same way. In one you say it is rational in the other you say it is faith.
Eh? In our context, the definition of faith is a belief in the existence of something without compelling evidence or argument. More generally it is a belief that is not rational.
Faith: belief without evidence/compelling argument. Rational: not believing without evidence/compelling argument.
Where is the special pleading?
Here you are implying that the evidence against god is equivalent to the evidence against the loch ness monster, rather than applying the standard of evidence given in both 10 and 14 for what is to be considered rational.
I have no idea where you are getting that. There is no 'standard of evidence' given. It just says that if no such evidence is presented, it is rational to believe it doesn't exist. If that statement is true when the entity is a monster, it is true when it is a deity. To think otherwise is special pleading for deities - surely?
Why not? Nothing in either question 10 or 14 leads to this conclusion, rather they set a standard for measuring the rationality of the beliefs.
As I said earlier, and you as you neglected to quote. "I actually don't think the premises allow for the conclusions here..."
The reason why I think it is not rational? I don't think an in depth exploration on epistemology is necessary - we're only considering consistency.
This also is false when you look at instances where things were believed to exist in spite of a lack of compelling evidence or argument for their existence, and later were found to be true.
How does that make it false to label such beliefs as faith-based? Faith-based claims can turn out to be true.
I repeat Message 63: You seem to be saying that 14 is only asking whether the choice is rational, so you only see rationality as the criteria, rather than any element of faith. It seems to me that you can only hold this view by being blind to other equally rational options.
In statement 10 I stated:
If p then q
Statement 14 says
If p then a (AND not q)
The two statements cannot both be true. It doesn't matter if there are 'other rational options' - If I say that statement 14 is true, I am saying that it is not rational despite saying that it was in statement 10. If you're going to repeat yourself, I suppose I might as well do likewise.
I know that if not believing Nessie exists is rational so is not believing in God. So when a statement says that not believing in god is not rational I have to say 'false'. Being a true/false statement implies that there is only one criteria to judge it by hence we should understand it to mean faith in the sense of 'the opposite of rationality'.
Not particularly. For a start, ecologists have good reason to think that the bird has existed - and have some evidence that suggests that it still exists. We know that low population species can be elusive, and birds are no exception.
So this doesn't really fall under the 'lack of compelling argument/evidence' category.
Eh? In our context, the definition of faith is a belief in the existence of something without compelling evidence or argument. More generally it is a belief that is not rational.
Faith: belief without evidence/compelling argument. Rational: not believing without evidence/compelling argument.
Where is the special pleading?
It's very simple:
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {A} it is rational to believe not{A}.
Let {B} = not{A}
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}.
There is no 'standard of evidence' given.
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {A} it is rational to believe not{A}. That is the standard for what constitutes a rational belief set by the game.
The reason why I think it is not rational? I don't think an in depth exploration on epistemology is necessary - we're only considering consistency.
Let {B} = not{A}
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}.
Consistency requires that {B} is just as rational as {A}.
So when a statement says that not believing in god is not rational I have to say 'false'.
But 14 doesn't say that, it says that the final choice is a matter of faith rather than rationality. What you have is a belief that is part faith and part rationality, and the part that is rationality does not predict the final choice, while the part that is faith does.
Both {A} and {B} are rational, by the standard of the game, and thus to choose between {A} and {B} is not a matter of rationality (that is a given), but of faith: it is the faith part that distinguishes {A} from {B}.
Faith: belief without evidence/compelling argument.
And it is a matter of faith because you have a lack of compelling evidence or argument.
Not particularly. For a start, ecologists have good reason to think that the bird has existed - and have some evidence that suggests that it still exists. We know that low population species can be elusive, and birds are no exception.
So this doesn't really fall under the 'lack of compelling argument/evidence' category.
So in the absence of convincing evidence for {B} (non-existence) it is rational to believe not{B} (existence).
And it is a matter of faith because you have a lack of compelling evidence or argument.
And if this represents your thinking, then obviously you answered false to statement 10. After all, it isn't rational to believe that the Loch Ness monster doesn't exist based purely on the fact that we haven't been able to turn up any evidence or argument in favour of its existence, right? That kind of belief, you argue, is faith-based...to get to the status of a belief isn't a matter of rationality.
So in the absence of convincing evidence for {B} (non-existence) it is rational to believe not{B} (existence).
You forgot to include 'compelling argument' which in the case of the birds , is not absent. That compelling argument is also based on convincing evidence - 1) We know that the birds have existed 2) We know that creatures that haven't been seen for a long time can still exist.
I started answering some of your other points but it seems like we are just repeating ourselves over and over in a variety of different ways. I understand your position on what is meant, I don't know if you understand my position but I don't see further repetitions are going to result in any worthwhile.
And if this represents your thinking, then obviously you answered false to statement 10.
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {A} it is rational to believe not{A}.
Thus a rational belief is simply one that is not contradicted by compelling evidence or argument, even though there may be some (inconclusive) evidence or argument against it, evidence that some people accept and others don't.
Question 10 doesn't ask to distinguish between faith and rationality, just to judge on the rationality: it is rational (to have faith in the absence of nessie), therefore true.
You forgot to include 'compelling argument' which in the case of the birds , is not absent.
Sorry, I was referring to the previous re-statement and missed typing that part. The argument still holds.
quote:Let {B} = not{A} In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} it is rational to believe not{B}.
In the absence of compelling evidence or argument for {B} (non-existence) it is rational to believe not{B} (existence).
The lack of compelling evidence or argument is for contradicting the belief, not for supporting it - that is the standard set by the game: for a belief to be considered rational it cannot be contradicted by compelling evidence or argument.
The belief in the continued absence of a loch ness monster (LNM) and the belief in the continued existence (before discovery) of the ivory billed woodpecker (IBW) meet that simple standard.
Thus a rational belief is simply one that is not contradicted by compelling evidence or argument, even though there may be some (inconclusive) evidence or argument against it, evidence that some people accept and others don't.
Well more specifically, a belief in the absence of the existence of an entity can be rational simply on the basis that there is no evidence or argument that exists that demonstrates its existence. That's statement 10.
Based on this then, we'd both agree that a belief in the absence of God is rational given the lack of evidence/argument demonstrating its existence.
Question 10 doesn't ask to distinguish between faith and rationality, just to judge on the rationality: it is rational (to have faith in the absence of nessie), therefore true.
And then according to 14, you think it is true that it is not a matter of rationality, but it is rational! And it's reading it in that light that I could not answer true to statement 14.
The belief in the continued absence of a loch ness monster (LNM) and the belief in the continued existence (before discovery) of the ivory billed woodpecker (IBW) meet that simple standard.
They don't meet the standard set in the game though. A belief in the absence of the existence of an entity can be rational simply on the basis that there is no evidence or argument that exists that demonstrates its existence assuming you answer 'true' to 10.
The belief in the existence of the woodpecker doesn't meet this standard for a number of reasons. First it is about believing the existence of an entity, rather than its absence - so we cannot use the above criteria to determine whether or not it is rational. Second, there are compelling reasons and evidence that supports its possible existence.
If the quiz had said 'It is rational to believe in the existence of something on the basis that there is no evidence or argument to support it' I would have answered 'false'. You might regard this as 'special pleading' but I think there are compelling arguments for taking the absence of existence as the null hypothesis in these kinds of discussions. I see no obligation to think that two opposite statements both have to be rational.
I take it you think this back and forth is worthwhile? I really do think we have reached the point of repeating ourselves and I can't see either of us changing our minds via repetition. We read the statements in a significantly different way and we've put our best reasons forward for reading it in the way that we do. I understand your reasoning, and I disagree that it is justified from the text. I don't know if you understand my reasoning, but it seems you disagree that it is justified from the text. What else can be said here?
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