Hi PaulK,
Ah, I see what you meant with absurdities.
1) I thought that with 'history' you meant the history after the creation of the universe, so in the case of YEC only the past 6 ky. Since I didn't mean model (1) to be the entire YEC view, but just the model as defined in my first post, I didn't want to discuss what YECs usually claim to have happened during the past 6 ky. I realize now that with 'history' you meant the timespan between 13.7 Gy and 6 ky ago. Of course that plays a role in this discussion, leaving this out of consideration would surely be absurd. However it is not relevant for this discussion what happened during this history, but whether the reality of this history can be tested. It appears that this indeed can be tested and science can favour statements concerning the age of the universe. Which is basically why I excluded model (1) from my proposition in post
Message 22.
I understand now that I have been a bit slow-witted. Thanks for being so patient with me!
2) On your second point I'm afraid we still disagree. I understand your position very well though, it's just that I see it slightly different.
I agree that it is more scientific to attribute for example lightning to electromagnetism instead of attributing it to a god. Not because electromagnetism is a natural mechanism, but because it is testable. Attributing it to a god is untestable, because you can't conduct experiments with gods. You can't say: "God, produce lightning now", well you can say it, but, even assuming this god exists, there is no reason why he would listen to you. With electromagnetism on the other hand, you can conduct an experiment in a lab with the same conditions and each time you do it, lightning will strike.
For the origin of the universe, I think model (2) and (3) are both untestable and therefore equally (un)scientific. I understand that you think model (3) is more scientific because you think natural explanations are by definiton more scientific and I can't say you're wrong. I shouldn't have used the word 'natural' in my definition of model (3), because it implies things that, in my opinion, do not apply to this model.
If a theory is testable, then it's scientific. If the tests do not falsify the theory, the theory apparently describes nature and therefor is called 'natural'. This however is not what I meant with 'natural' in my definition of model (3), because I don't think these 'natural' events can be tested. What I meant was that these events (according to this theory) will occur again under the same conditions. They are (according to this theory) a consequence of the circumstances in combination with the way
nature reacts on these circumstances. Therefor I called them natural, but I didn't meant 'testable' and certainly not 'verified by tests'.
I already said that I didn't want to accuse you of prejudices; I'll explain here what I meant in more detail. What I wasn't saying is: "It's prejudiced to state something, because it's also prejudiced to state the opposite." That would basically make all statements prejudiced. What I meant with prejudices is taking a natural explanation as your starting point. After that you can ask whether we should keep this natural explanation or substitute a god for it. But why don't we start with: "We don't know what the cause of the existence of the universe is." and think about which optional explanations there are after that.
Greets Stellatic
"What interests me is whether God had a choice when he created the world.". --Albert Einstein